
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## Table of Contents

**Section 1- Arts and Humanities**
"A Reflection of the Past: Tarkovsky's Eclectic Cinematography in *Mirror"* ……..…. 4
*Peter Guma, Dickinson College*

"Cult of Isis Frescoes as Narratives at the Temple of Isis in Pompeii" …….……... 13
*Kirsten Bell, University of Rochester*

**Section 2- Central Europe: Past and Present**
"Potential and Problematics: European Union Enlargement of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in the 21st Century"……..... 21
*Vanesa Simic, DePaul University*

"Local History and Changes in Space Recorded in Toponymy and Microtoponymy:
The Example of Korniaktów Południowy Village" ……..……..……...…… 32
*Anna Brodowicz, University of Warsaw*

**Section 3- Challenges in Democracy**
"Torture and the Evolution of Muscovite Law*"* ……...……..……..... 41
*Daniel Wiltse, Macalester College*

**Section 4- Chernobyl Memory Museum**
"The Importance of Context: An Example of Growing Perspective*"* ……...……..……. 48
*Madelena Lapinski, University of Pittsburgh*

"The World is Watching: Global Reactions to the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster" ……...……. 54
*Kate Sandridge, University of Pittsburgh*

**Section 5- Political (In)Stability and Migration**
"Examining the Relationship Between Slovak Immigrants and Labor" …….…….. 59
*Alec Ott, University of North Carolina Wilmington (UNCW)*

"Crusades as a Movement in the Pursuit of Power" …….……. 64
*Yijin Qu, University of Rochester*

**Section 6- Volatile National Identities in the Post-Soviet Space**
"The Impacts of Linguistic Variance on Higher Education Experiences in Kyrgyzstan" ……...…. 73
*Lily Nemirovsky, Mount Holyoke College*

**Section 7- Women's Studies**
"Bridal Abductions: Cultural Norms vs. Human Rights in Kyrgyzstan" ……. 85
*Michael Sipper, University of Pittsburgh*

"Suspended Violence: Princess Olga and Feminine Violence in Medieval Rus …….. 95
*Anya Armentrout, Macalester College*

# SECTION 1

## ARTS AND HUMANITIES

**"A Reflection of the Past: Tarkovsky's Eclectic Cinematography in *Mirror*"**
*Peter Guma, Dickinson College*

In the Western world, Andrei Tarkovsky holds a prominent position as the foremost Soviet filmmaker of the late Soviet era. One of his most critically acclaimed and structurally complex films, *Mirror*, is a groundbreaking experiment in dreamscapes, nonlinear storylines, and autobiographical cinema.[1,2] While highly innovative, Tarkovsky did not work in a bubble. In conceiving and producing his films, Tarkovsky could reference decades of Soviet cinematography, including the work of early innovators Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov, whose otherwise distinct approaches to cinema share a similar emphasis on editing and montage.[3] Donato Totaro argues that while Tarkovsky acknowledged his predecessors, he reoriented Soviet cinema away from montage as its "main formative element," in favor of "rhythm."[4,5] While Tarkovsky's basic camera techniques recall Eisenstein and Vertov in their careful synchronization, Tarkovsky used zooming, slow pacing, and tracking shots differently, instead favoring close-ups that comprise entire shots and exceptionally long takes. Analyzing a few scenes with these methods in mind will reveal what makes *Mirror* distinctive. In this paper, I will explore the extent to which Tarkovsky's cinematic techniques in *Mirror* reflect those of Eisenstein and Vertov, concluding that these directors strongly influenced Tarkovsky in the areas of visual composition and sound.

Sergei Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin* is noteworthy for its intellectual and rhythmic montage, parallel motions, movement along diagonals, close-ups, and both high- and low-angled shots.[6] Eisenstein used all these techniques in the "Odessa steps" sequence, where the camera alternates between the fleeing crowds (fig. 1a) and the Cossacks shooting them along the same top-left to bottom-right diagonal (fig. 1b).[7]



Figure 1a. Crowds on the Odessa Steps.



Figure 1b. Cossacks on the Odessa Steps.

[1] Robert Bird, *Andrei Tarkovsky: Elements of Cinema* (Reaktion, 2008), 28.
[2] Donato Totaro, "Time and the Film Aesthetics of Andrei Tarkovsky," *Revue Canadienne d'Études Cinématographiques / Canadian Journal of Film Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 24.
[3] Ibid., 22.
[4] Ibid.
[5] According to Totaro, Tarkovsky defines rhythm as the result of how time flows through a shot.
[6] Paraphrasing Balázs ("Montage"), montage refers to an assembly of shots that together produce a desired effect. Specific forms of montage Eisenstein pioneered include intellectual, rhythmic, metric, tonal, and overtonal.
[7] I am using the Soviet-era spelling of the city's name due to the historical nature of my topic and its Soviet-geographical focus.

Eisenstein carefully and precisely chose his camera angles to juxtapose the two sides of the conflict. He also contrasted the Cossacks' guns, which obscure their users' faces and dominate the screen in figure 1b, with ordinary, unarmed people in figure 1a (in the figures, the red arrows represent the directions of motion in each shot, which look to be parallel). This human touch prompts the audience to sympathize with the people of Odessa over their faceless oppressors. Eisenstein's talent lies in telling an emotionally compelling story with clever camerawork, particularly through montage, edited together with soundless intertitles for dialogue, scene descriptions, and building suspense.[8] Tarkovsky, as we will see, accomplishes a similar feat with a greater emphasis on composition than on montage.

Structurally, *Potemkin* has a clear, linear plot divided into five acts that advocate for revolution and constitute Eisenstein's early attempt at intellectual cinema. The film progresses from an injustice on board the title ship to the mutineers' miraculous victory. The goal of intellectual cinema, which Eisenstein hoped to achieve with *Potemkin*, is to make abstract ideas concrete and accessible.[9,10] Eisenstein believed it was possible to convey the essence of a work such as Marx's *Das Kapital* by properly arranging a series of images that correspond to individual ideas.[11,12] As Maureen Kiernan asserts, Eisenstein utilized the new cinematic medium to spread his Marxist ideology, having made *Potemkin* "within the [theoretical] framework of Marxism."[13] Eisenstein's "The Problem of the Materialist Approach to Form" specifically addresses the importance of the masses, a central focus of Marxism, for conveying ideology through film: "The *mass* material was put forward as the material *most capable* of establishing *in relief* the ideological principle being expounded."[14,15] Still, despite the director's attempts at intellectual cinema, according to David Bordwell, Eisenstein admitted that it was "an ideal that was never realized."[16] Eisenstein noted in "Perspectives" that true intellectual cinema would need to replicate "the pure, dialectical essence of [Soviet] cinema culture ... without recourse to intermediaries like plot, story or living man."[17] He himself was dissatisfied with the film industry's progress towards this goal as of 1929.[18]

Subsequently, the advent of sound film fundamentally changed Eisenstein's aesthetics. As Peter Wollen points out, Eisenstein replaced intellectual montage with tonal montage (matching the emotional tone) and overtonal montage (combining several types of montage) to synchronize visuals with audio.[19] The films *Alexander Nevsky* and *Ivan the Terrible* embody this novel

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[8] Maureen Kiernan, "Making Films Politically: Marxism in Eisenstein and Godard," *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, no. 10 (1990): 95–101, https://www.jstor.org/stable/521719?origin=crossref.
[9] James W. Newcomb, "Eisenstein's Aesthetics," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 32, no. 4 (Summer 1974): 472, https://doi.org/10.2307/429362.
[10] Richard Taylor, "Introduction," in *S.M. Eisenstein: Selected Works*, ed. and trans. Richard Taylor (British Film Institute, 1988), 16–20.
[11] Newcomb, "Eisenstein's Aesthetics," 471.
[12] Béla Balázs, "Montage," in *Bela Balazs: Early Film Theory: Visible Man and The Spirit of Film*, ed. Erica Carter (Berghahn Books, 2011), 128.
[13] Kiernan, "Marxism in Eisenstein and Godard," 95.
[14] Sergei M. Eisenstein, "The Problem of the Materialist Approach to Form," in *S.M. Eisenstein: Selected Works*, ed. and trans. Richard Taylor (British Film Institute, 1988), 61.
[15] Kiernan, "Marxism in Eisenstein and Godard," 95.
[16] Newcomb, "Eisenstein's Aesthetics," 471.
[17] Sergei M. Eisenstein, "Perspectives," in *S.M. Eisenstein: Selected Works*, ed. and trans. Richard Taylor (British Film Institute, 1988), 159–160.
[18] Ibid., 159.
[19] Peter Wollen, "Perhaps..." *October* 88 (Spring 1999): 46, https://doi.org/10.2307/779223.

approach and lend themselves to especially complex analysis, despite being less popular among Soviet critics than Eisenstein's earlier work.[20,21] While Eisenstein's style evolved over his career, montage remains his signature technique.[22] For this reason, discussing how Tarkovsky understood the place of montage in cinema will illustrate how their approaches differ.



Figure 2a. Human with an abacus.




Figure 2b. Automation.

Although Dziga Vertov also experimented with montage, close-ups, superpositions, and point of view, his method of documentary cinema rejected a clear, cohesive narrative in favor of spontaneity and true-to-life filming. The director incorporated montage in his documentary magnum opus, *Man with a Movie Camera*, to draw parallels between the actions of humans (fig. 2a) and machines (fig. 2b).[23] Unlike figures 1a and 1b, whose movements rigidly parallel one another, in figures 2a and 2b, Vertov edited together two seemingly unrelated shots that are thematically similar. The arrows in figures 2a and 2b, which also indicate the directions of motion, are at most mirror images of each other—neither parallel, nor perpendicular. Considering Vertov's belief that "the machine makes us ashamed of man's inability to control himself," he likely chose these peculiar camera angles and directions of motion to draw attention to the difference in capabilities between humans and technology.[24] Similar to Eisenstein's proposed intellectual cinema, figures 2a and 2b encapsulate an ideological text. However, that text happens to be Vertov's own writing on the superiority of machines rather than a Marxist philosophical treatise.[25,26]

Driving Vertov's choice of techniques in *Man with a Movie Camera* was his theory of kino-eye and *kino-pravda*: whereas kino-eye asserts that film purifies our perception of the world, *kino-pravda* claims that it reveals a deep truth hidden from the viewer. Vertov variously defined kino-eye, most succinctly as "life caught unawares," suggesting that film should be natural and spontaneous.[27] These two concepts underlie Vertov's work and take priority over presenting a linear plot. As Vlada Petric observes in "Dziga Vertov as Theorist," filming real people and

[20] Ibid., 46–49.
[21] Kiernan, "Marxism in Eisenstein and Godard," 94.
[22] Newcomb, "Eisenstein's Aesthetics," 471.
[23] David Bordwell, "Dziga Vertov," *Film Comment* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1972): 41, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43752889.
[24] Lev Manovich, "Kino-Eye in Reverse: Visualizing Cinema," in *Cinematicity in Media History*, ed. Jeffrey Geiger and Karin Littau (Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 224.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Newcomb, "Eisenstein's Aesthetics," 471.
[27] Manovich, "Kino-Eye in Reverse," 215.

arranging the shots into montage formed the foundation of Vertov's *kino-pravda*.[28] The selection of shots is key to *kino-pravda* because therein lies the potential for uncovering a new truth. Vertov was adamant that poorly selected film material would lead to "quasi-facts" corrupting the intended message, as he proposes in "On *Kinopravda*": "The moment and the manner in which we admit life into the lens and the way in which we fix the trace that remains determine ... the quality of the whole object."[29,30] The same can be inferred about montage's relationship to kino-eye: the meaning film reveals to us depends on its source material.

Eisenstein and Vertov each leveraged editing and montage to convey a message; however, Eisenstein's orderly cinematography was primarily designed to advance a political cause, whereas Vertov's early work aimed to showcase the power of technology. Eisenstein explicitly defined intellectual cinema as something to strive towards, a goal for filmmakers alongside effective montage.[31,32] Telling a story, as he did in *Battleship Potemkin*, was one way to make the idea of revolution approachable to a variety of audiences. Allegories serve a similar purpose in literature. In contrast, *Man with a Movie Camera* is Vertov's exhibition of "the absolute power of the camera" rather than a consistent narrative.[33] Bordwell lists several examples from this film other than figures 2a and 2b that juxtapose machines and humans, all actions which relate to filmmaking.[34] The process of making a film, depicted through montage in the service of metaphor, takes the place of a traditional narrative in *Man with a Movie Camera*.[35] Vertov's attitude towards plot and narrative is similar to that of Tarkovsky, who aimed to use "non-literary patterns of storytelling" in his films instead of adhering to a linear narrative.[36] At the same time, Tarkovsky did so in pursuit of a "pure cinema," language which mirrors Eisenstein's theory of intellectual cinema.[37,38] To further understand how Vertov and Eisenstein's camerawork differs, consider the following quote from Petric: "Eisenstein deals mostly with the graphic structure of the shot, … while Vertov emphasizes the tension created by the movements continuing or conflicting from one shot to another, combined with the camera movements."[39] That is, Vertov prioritized interesting motion over pleasing aesthetics. Consequently, Vertov's average shot length is slightly quicker than Eisenstein's: 2.3 shots per second for *Man with a Movie Camera*, as opposed to 2.7 for *Battleship Potemkin.*

Andrei Tarkovsky echoed his predecessors' use of montage by incorporating into *Mirror* the documentary footage available to him. However, he refused to accept that "film was made on the editing table."[40] Let us now delve into how Tarkovsky innovatively incorporated modern cinematic techniques, drawing parallels with the styles of Dziga Vertov and Sergei Eisenstein.

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[28] Vlada Petric, "Dziga Vertov as Theorist," *Cinema Journal* 18, no. 1 (Autumn 1978): 32–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/1225210.
[29] Dziga Vertov, "On *Kinopravda,*" in *Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov*, ed. Annette Michelson (University of California Press, 1985), 45.
[30] Petric, "Dziga Vertov as Theorist," 33.
[31] Newcomb, "Eisenstein's Aesthetics," 471–472.
[32] Eisenstein, "Perspectives," 159–160.
[33] Bordwell, "Dziga Vertov," 41.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 40.
[36] Bird, *Andrei Tarkovsky*, 108.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Eisenstein, "Perspectives," 159–160.
[39] Petric, "Dziga Vertov as Theorist," 36.
[40] Totaro, "Time and the Film Aesthetics of Andrei Tarkovsky," 22.

In the "printing house" scene of *Mirror*, Tarkovsky centers the action around a single, extended tracking shot of the narrator's mother to convey her nervous energy to the audience. Fearing that she misspelled Stalin's name in a special edition newspaper, the mother rushes to the printing house to correct her presumed error. Regardless of the actual consequences for such a mistake, her response reflects the mood of the era. Tarkovsky opens with her entering through a door on the right, after which she walks past several machines, searches a closet, talks with her supervisor, and doubles back to review the manuscript in question. This tracking shot is unusual because the mother remains in the frame for over a minute; all the other actors avoid fully blocking her from our line of sight. While the pacing is one of the fastest in *Mirror*, it correlates with the lead female character's agitated mental state. Elsewhere in *Mirror*, Tarkovsky is slower and more methodical. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the "printing house" scene is that a machine frames Stalin's face as the narrator's mother checks the manuscript (fig. 3). Doing so associates the dictator with both industrialization and surveillance. This creative decision also firmly places us in the narrative past of Stalinist Russia with its culture of fear and repression. Even without hearing the mother's internal monologue, the audience understands viscerally the consequences of her would-be mistake.



Figure 3. The printing house scene.

Next, when Ignat and his mother visit a rural acquaintance, Tarkovsky synchronizes slow zooming, music, and lighting to make us reconsider our impression of the boy. Left alone, Ignat paces a dimly lit room before staring at himself in a landscape-style mirror. The tone of the music perfectly matches what the viewer sees as the camera zooms into his reflection. First, warm lighting illuminates the left half of his face (fig. 4a) as pleasant music increases in volume. The instant his face becomes coldly lit on the other side (fig. 4b), the music becomes quieter and more ominous. With this stylistic choice, Tarkovsky alienates us from our original perception of the boy: his youthful innocence seems to vanish in favor of a disturbing glare. Only after the camera cuts and zooms into his actual face does the audience see his sparkling eyes (fig. 4c), reassurance that the darker reflection was an illusion.



Figure 4a. Initial Reflection.



Figure 4b. Later Reflection.



Figure 4c. Ignat.

The unsettlingly slow pace raises the question of to what extent Ignat is like his father, whose life the film seeks to unpack. The subsequent cut to a woman resembling the redhead from his father's past, but with a more serious expression, supports this interpretation.

Having analyzed Tarkovsky's cinematic techniques in *Mirror*, we are now ready to discuss traces of Eisenstein's and Vertov's cinematography that appear in Tarkovsky's work. The scenes mentioned earlier showcase Tarkovsky's detailed focus on visual composition, akin to Eisenstein, while his approach to industrial sound brings to mind the techniques used by Vertov.[41,42] We have already established that Eisenstein's *Potemkin* includes intertitles to complement montage, and as one would expect, to circumvent the limitations of early film technology.[43] With the advent of sound cinema, Eisenstein pivoted to using sound for background music and dialogue, as in his later, two-part film *Ivan the Terrible*.[44,45] Vertov, on the other hand, saw value in "documenting sounds" through film.[46] Lucy Fischer similarly describes Vertov as preferring "audiovisual collage" to standard, synchronous dialogue.[47] In this respect, Eisenstein and Vertov are diametrically opposed in their usage of sound. Therefore, the presence of music, dialogue, and industrial sound in *Mirror* illustrates the directors' shared influence on Tarkovsky.

Throughout the "printing house" scene of *Mirror*, the audience sees and hears the rows of printing presses whose cacophony brings to mind Vertov, particularly his ode to industrialization *Enthusiasm*.[48] Although Tarkovsky does include some dialogue between the narrator's mother and her supervisor, as well as between her colleagues and the printing crew, the camerawork focuses our attention on her movement against a backdrop of noisy machines. Tarkovsky appears to be, at first examination, Vertov's disciple. However, figure 3's aesthetically pleasing framing makes Tarkovsky more similar to Eisenstein, as Petric describes him, than to Vertov.[49] As in the scene from *Battleship Potemkin* in which Eisenstein evenly splits the ship's crew into two parallel lines

[41] Petric, "Dziga Vertov as Theorist," 36.
[42] Lucy Fischer, "'Enthusiasm': From Kino-Eye to Radio-Eye," *Film Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Winter 1977): 25–26, https://doi.org/10.2307/1211784.
[43] Kiernan, "Marxism in Eisenstein and Godard," 95–101.
[44] Joan Neuberger, "The Music of Landscape: Eisenstein, Prokofiev, and the Uses of Music in Ivan the Terrible," in *Sound, Speech, Music in Soviet and Post-Soviet Cinema*, ed. Lilya Kaganovsky and Masha Salazkina (Indiana University Press, 2014), 212–213.
[45] Lea Jacobs, "A Lesson with Eisenstein: Rhythm and Pacing in Ivan the Terrible, Part I," *Music and the Moving Image* 5, no. 1 (2012): 25–26, https://doi.org/10.5406/musimoviimag.5.1.0024.
[46] Bordwell, "Dziga Vertov," 38.
[47] Fischer, "'Enthusiasm': From Kino-Eye to Radio-Eye," 27.
[48] Oksana Bulgakowa and David Bordwell, "The Ear against the Eye: Vertov's 'Symphony' [with Response]," *Monatshefte* 98, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 219–43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30157777.
[49] Petric, "Dziga Vertov as Theorist," 36.

around their officers, two people frame Tarkovsky's female protagonist on either side—that is, if we count the picture of Stalin. The artistic composition of figure 3 suggests that Vertov's influence on Tarkovsky's moving shots does not carry over to stand-alone visuals. It follows that each early director shaped Tarkovsky's cinematic style.

Despite the artistic similarities between *Mirror* and the works of Vertov and Eisenstein, Tarkovsky's distinctive style in the scene with Ignat is rooted in zooming and exceptionally slow pacing. While the cinematography resembles Vertov in the use of zooming, Vertov's shots are shorter and quicker. The two close-ups of Ignat's face differ from the close-ups in *Man with a Movie Camera*, which usually comprise a larger sequence. Ignat is our focus before and after the single cut, reducing the likelihood of Vertov-inspired montage. Tarkovsky's extensive use of zooming also differentiates him from the plot-oriented Eisenstein, who, at least in his early work, refrained from peering into a character's emotional state in this way. Eisenstein conveyed his message in *Battleship Potemkin* with intertitles and montage rather than with a few long takes, ensuring that his characters' feelings are clear from the action. Zooming combined with slow pacing makes Tarkovsky's scene with Ignat especially haunting.

Similarly, the 100-second "printing house" take reveals that extended tracking shots and minimal reliance on montage are additional elements that distinguish Tarkovsky from Vertov and Eisenstein. The tracking shot of the narrator's mother in *Mirror* is a full minute longer than any shot of the cameraman in *Man with a Movie Camera* (peaking at approximately nine seconds) or of the crowds in *Battleship Potemkin* (at most thirty seconds). Tarkovsky's camerawork is unorthodox in that the main character moves back and forth from the middle to the sides of the frame. This happens concurrently with her zigzagging past a table and around a corner. Thus, the scene feels more fluid and natural than the unidirectional motions of Eisenstein in figures 1a and 1b and of Vertov in figures 2a and 2b.

As previously established, Tarkovsky's predecessors implemented montage by editing together a series of mostly short takes. Although montage is by definition merely an assembly of shots, a move from one take to another, relying more on long takes yields a greater impression of continuity. In a break from the norm established by Eisenstein and Vertov, Tarkovsky instead juxtaposed the narrator's mother with Stalin within the same shot, the "printing house" take. By extension, Tarkovsky associated the communist leader with the mother's typo, the focal point of figure 3. Tarkovsky demonstrated that clever composition can be just as effective as montage for conveying deeper meaning. This interpretation could be either a stab at *kino-pravda* or a contemporary reformulation of it, but the latter seems more probable as Tarkovsky deemphasized rather than rejected montage as the essence of film.[50]

The wealth of cinematic masterpieces available to Tarkovsky, his upbringing around Soviet intelligentsia, increasingly advanced film technology, stable political conditions under Brezhnev, and the opportunity to travel to Europe all enabled Tarkovsky to create a highly memorable, if difficult-to-understand film. This essay analyzed how zooming, slow pacing, and long tracking shots differentiate Tarkovsky from Eisenstein and Vertov, from whom he borrowed a handful of elementary camera techniques. Further research should explore what other source material was available to Tarkovsky, such as Italian art and cinematography or the documentary footage he incorporated into *Mirror*. In any case, Eisenstein and Vertov are only two of the many early Soviet directors whose innovations continue to shape contemporary cinema. Comparing Tarkovsky to Vsevolod Pudovkin, for example, may deepen our appreciation of Tarkovsky's eclectic cinematic style.

[50] Totaro, "Time and the Film Aesthetics of Andrei Tarkovsky," 22.

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**"Cult of Isis Frescoes as Narratives at the Temple of Isis in Pompeii"**
*Kirsten Bell, University of Rochester*

Isis, originally an Egyptian goddess that possessed magical powers and healing abilities,[1] was a figure of great intrigue and admiration in the Classical world. As with the entirety of Egypt as a whole, with the land, religion, writing, and culture viewed as exotic and mystical, interest in the figure of Isis was partially a product of European "Egyptomania,"[2] the fixation and obsession that European societies have with Egypt. An example of Egyptomania can be demonstrated in figure 1 below, a hieroglyphic stela, which was found displayed in the Temple of Isis in Pompeii. This tablet narrates various stories of pharaohs from Egypt, from the last dynasty to the conquest of Alexander the Great. Therefore, it is strange why this artifact would be found in a temple specifically dedicated to the goddess Isis, because the tablet has nothing to do with Isis on its own. Since Romans did not have the ability to read complex hieroglyphs, it can be assumed that they displayed this in their temple because they were fascinated by the "Egyptianess" of it.



Figure 1. Hieroglyphic stela. (Photograph from Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli, https://mann-napoli.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2-Stele-geroglifica-inv.-1035-scaled-1.jpg).

Beginning with the cult of Isis as a whole, the cult was considered an exotic and foreign religious group in Rome, with scholars such as Eric M. Orlin stating that "Egyptian rites and Egyptian culture were welcomed at Rome but clearly marked as exotic, enabling a clearer definition of Roman identity."[3] This separation of Roman and Egyptian culture allowed for Romans to outline what made Romans truly Roman by explicitly demarcating what was not Roman, in this case Egyptian culture. This made Egyptian culture seem exotic to Romans instead of synonymous with their own culture, which can clearly be seen in the frescoes discussed in this paper. The frescoes that will be analyzed will shine a light on how the Romans would look at them

[1] George Hart, *The Routledge Dictionary of Egyptian Gods and Goddesses* (Routledge, 2005), 79.
[2] Bob Brier, "Egyptomania!" *Archaeology* 57, no. 1 (2004): 16–22.
[3] Eric M. Orlin, "Octavian and Egyptian Cults: Redrawing the Boundaries of Romanness," *The American Journal of Philology* 129, no. 2 (2008): 248.

in light of their foreignness, and how Egypt was made appealing to Romans. Generally, Isis was viewed by Romans and also Greeks as the ultimate healer and mother goddess. This is partially due to her roles in traditional Egyptian mythology, with Isis magically healing her husband Osiris, the god of the underworld, and being the mother of the prominent falcon-headed god Horus, who was intrinsically connected to the throne of Egypt.[4]

Both of the frescoes discussed below were found in the *ekklesiasterion* section of the Isis temple in Pompeii and are titled *Isis and Io at Canopus* and *Worship of Osiris' Sarcophagus*. *Isis and Io at Canopus*, seen in figure 2, depicts the Greek Io and Egyptian Isis meeting at the Nile River port in the Egyptian city of Canopus. The fresco *Worship of Osiris' Sarcophagus*, seen in figure 3, portrays an idyllic nature scene where a ceremony honoring Isis' husband, Osiris, is taking place. This *ekklesiasterion* room was where "worshippers of Isis gathered and ritual banquets were held,"[5] and was also the size of "a large hall…dedicated to meetings of the initiates."[6] There was also a portico-style courtyard where the temple sat, a *purgatorium* that led to the sacred Nile water basin, and a smaller room where initiates could also meet and look at frescoes called the *sacrarium*.[7] These aspects of the Isis temple are clearly from the viewpoint of Romans interpreting a foreign religion. The temple itself was not that different from a normal Roman temple in terms of architectural design but had subtle Egyptian elements that made the culture palpable to Romans. This notion can also be seen in the frescoes, because they are clearly painted in a Roman style with the figures having understated indications of being Egyptian, such as the animals around the figures or Egyptian-style patterns or objects present.

With the popularity of the cult among the lower classes in the Roman Empire,[8] some interesting observations about these frescoes can be observed. This cult provided a hopeful alternative to the mainstream state Roman religion, where things like a positive life after death and magical healing properties would be offered. Since initiates into the cult most likely could not read texts about Isis, these frescoes served as narratives to teach members about aspects of the goddess and the cult. These depictions show stories about Isis including her relationship with other deities, geographical features, and religious connection. They acted as chronicles in an aesthetically pleasing and artistic way to demonstrate why Isis was such an important deity and why they should worship her.

[4] Hart, *Dictionary of Egyptian Gods and Goddesses,* 80.
[5] Salvatore Nappo, *Pompeii: Guide to the Lost City* (Weidenfeld & Nicoloson, 1998), 89-91.
[6] "Temple of Isis," Pompeii, accessed September 6, 2024, http://pompeiisites.org/en/archaeological-site/temple-of-isis/.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Orlin, "Octavian and Egyptian Cults," 235.



Figure 2. Fresco depicting Isis and Io at Canopus. (Photograph from Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli, https://mann-napoli.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/11-Quadro-con-Io-a-Canopo-inv.-9558-IO-E-CANOPO-scaled-1.jpg).

Beginning with one of the most famous fresco paintings in the Temple of Isis in Pompeii, *Isis and Io at Canopus* above depicts the goddess Io being welcomed into Egypt by the goddess Isis. Io is the figure on the left and is carried on the shoulder of a Nile River god. She is also shown with horns reminiscent of a heifer. This is due to her connection with white heifers because she was transformed into one by Zeus to protect her from the wrath of his wife, Hera. In traditional Greek mythology, Io was a princess who Zeus fell in love with. After being turned into a heifer, she supposedly wandered all over the Earth and was restored to her original form when she traveled to Egypt.[9] Isis is on the right, depicted with a snake and a crocodile, which are animals often associated with Egypt, with some cult followers behind her. Her followers are holding *sistri*, musical instruments connected with the Isis cult. She is also portrayed in a seemingly Greco-Roman style, with light skin, a laurel wreath atop her head, and Roman style dress. Additionally, this scene is supposed to take place in the Egyptian city of Canopus, which was a port town used for trade with Greece. It was also the site of an extensive temple to the Greco-Egyptian god Serapis, who was also associated with a bull, and Osiris who was Isis' husband.[10]

However, an aspect of this story that adds an interesting layer to this fresco is that the Greeks believed that Io and Isis were the same goddess, only that the Egyptians worshiped her as Isis.[11] Therefore, this fresco may represent the connection between Greek and Egyptian ideologies and stories, and how Romans interpret this connection. This theory also connects with the location in the painting, Canopus, since the aforementioned bull god Serapis and Osiris were famously worshiped there, and trade occurred there between Greece and Egypt. Isis' contribution to Osiris' resurrection and healing was a very important aspect to the myth and to the cult of Isis, and Serapis was a Greco-Egyptian deity. All of these connections between Greece and Rome establish a direct relationship between Europe and Egypt, because the Roman cult of Isis was partly an interpretation of Greek interpretations of Egyptian religion. As the scholar Robert Turcan states, the Isis cult "did not arrive in the pure and raw state of their country of origin. [It] had…undergone the effects of

[9] Apollodorus, *The Library*, trans. Sir James George Frazer (William Heinemann, 1921), 128-144.
[10] Christian H. Bull, "Prophesying the Demise of Egyptian Religion in Late Antiquity: The Perfect Discourse and Antoninus in Canopus," *Numen* 68, n. 2-3 (2021): 191.
[11] "Io," Theoi Greek Mythology, accessed September 6, 2024, https://www.theoi.com/Heroine/Io.html.

Hellenic filtration, both in their imagery and the form of their liturgy, even in the very structure of their initiatory ceremonies."[12] This Greek-Egyptian relationship is depicted in this fresco by directly showing Io, representing Greece, and Isis, representing Egypt, touching, and Io being delivered to Isis at the meeting point between the two civilizations, Canopus. The Romans were famous for adopting foreign, most famously Greek, gods and goddesses into their own systems of worship, and interpreting their stories to fit their own culture. Here we see this with the Isis cult, with most depictions of Isis not looking distinctly Egyptian. She resembles a Roman woman or goddess with details that indicate that she is Isis, as in this fresco with the snake, crocodile, and cult followers present.

Another aspect of the myth that surrounds this fresco is that Io's transformation into an animal and then back into a human through Isis' influence is not isolated to this story. An additional narrative where these transformations occur is in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*. The main character of this work, Lucius, is accidentally turned into a donkey by a witch from Thessaly, and it is only when he travels to Egypt and joins the cult of Isis that he is transformed back into a human. Right after he transforms back into a human, the surrounding people:

> …were amazed, and the faithful bowed down before this public manifestation of the power of the great goddess [Isis], the ease with which the transformation was accomplished and its miraculous conformity with the nocturnal visions; and raising their hands to heaven, loudly and with one voice they bore witness to the goddess's marvellous beneficence.[13]

In this work there is a great contrast between positive magic as opposed to harmful magic, with Isis viewed as the supreme entity of holy and healing magic while a Thessalian witch's magic is seen as damaging. In this transformation scene it is portrayed as easy for Isis to perform this miracle, and her great generosity is highlighted. This glorification of Isis' magic is in contrast to the Thessalian witch, Pamphile, who is described as evil. Lucius is warned to "watch out for the wicked wiles and criminal enticements of that woman Pamphile, the one that's married to Milo…Never lower your guard. They say she's a top-class witch, mistress of every kind of graveyard spell."[14] This witch in Thessaly, which is a place famous for witchcraft in Greece,[15] serves to highlight the superiority of Isis' positive magic by demonstrating Isis' benevolence and the devotion of her followers.[16]

It is interesting that both Io and Lucius experience salvation when they travel to Egypt, and this narrative of Egypt being the land of positive Isis magic is meant to be understood by the cult followers in this fresco. Since both Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* and the story of Io contain these sentiments of Egyptian salvation, it can be assumed that this was an idea circulating throughout the Greco-Roman world. For a Roman member of the Isis cult to view this fresco that depicts this shared relationship of Europe with Egypt, it is suggestive that this relationship was commonplace. It is meant to show the holy deliverance that following an Egyptian cult could bring to a Roman and would encourage devotion to Isis and her native land.

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[12] Robert Turcan, *The Cults of the Roman Empire*, trans. Antonia Nevill (Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 5.
[13] Apuleius, *The Golden Ass or Metamorphoses*, trans. E. J. Kenney (Penguin Books, 2004), 176-177.
[14] Ibid., 17.
[15] See Kenney's "Introduction" in Apuleius' book listed above.
[16] Stavros Frangoulidis, *Witches, Isis and Narrative: Approaches to Magic in Apuleius' Metamorphoses* (De Gruyter, 2008), 5-6.



Figure 3. Fresco depicting ceremony in honor of the sarcophagus of Osiris. (Photograph from ArchaiOptix, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wall_painting_-_idyllic_landscape_with_sarcophagus_of_Osiris_-_Pompeii_(VIII_7_28_-_sanctuary_of_Isis_-_ekklesiasterion)_-_Napoli_MAN_8570_-_01.jpg).

Advancing to the second fresco, *Worship of Osiris' Sarcophagus* also depicts this attempt to make Egypt and Isis comprehensible to a Roman audience. It was located directly next to the aforementioned fresco of Io and Isis,[17] and provides another aspect of the Isis narrative intended to inspire and amaze the cult members. This scene focuses on the specific story of the resurrection of Osiris, Isis' husband, and how this is an important and mystical event. According to Plutarch's version of this legend, Osiris' brother Seth betrayed Osiris by creating a chest or sarcophagus sized to Osiris' exact measurements that was offered at a banquet to anyone who fit inside it. Once Osiris climbed in, the chest was sealed and thrown into the Nile. Isis finds the chest and while she leaves it alone, Seth discovers it and cuts Osiris' body into fourteen parts and scatters it throughout the Nile Valley. Isis then goes and finds each part and magically reassembles and heals Osiris.[18] In this fresco, it seems that this scene of resurrection is yet to happen, and Osiris is still sealed in this sarcophagus. The fresco is painted in a very ethereal and aesthetically pleasing way, with an Egyptian style temple or portal in the middle that holds a decorated sarcophagus and a *hierogrammateus*, a type of Egyptian priest, holding a tray of offerings towards the sarcophagus.[19] There are also other Egyptian stylistic or cultural references in this fresco, such as the fisherman on the river, but done in a sort of European romantic way with the color choices and painting style. There is not a notable difference between other Roman frescoes and this one in terms of style, similarly to the aforementioned Io and Isis fresco where they both resemble Roman women.

Additionally, the hazy style and resurrection scene of Osiris in this fresco may cause the viewer to ponder life's mysteries, such as the relationship between life and death, while the fresco's "magnificent sacral architecture and breathtaking nature…intimate that the mysteries of life and

[17] David L. Balch, "The Suffering of Isis / Io and Paul's Portrait of Christ Crucified (Gal. 3:1): Frescoes in Pompeian and Roman Houses and in the Temple of Isis in Pompeii," *The Journal of Religion* 83, no. 1 (2003): 48.
[18] Hart, *Dictionary of Egyptian Gods and Goddesses,* 123-4.
[19] Frederick E. Brenk, "A Gleaming Ray: Blessed Afterlife in the Mysteries," *Illinois Classical Studies* 18 (1993): 162.

of the goddess are ultimately indistinguishable."[20] The misty background and exotic Egyptian ceremony taking place reflect the mysterious aspect of this cult, as the scene has to do with death and rebirth through magical means. Additionally, not only will the viewer think about this death and rebirth cycle in general but specifically the Egyptian cycle of death and rebirth. The fresco does not portray Osiris after he is resurrected, but instead chooses to depict the scene right before it that includes a sarcophagus. Mummies are stereotypically very Egyptian, and it would not have been as compelling or "foreign" if Osiris' sarcophagus was not included.

What a follower of the Isis cult would gain from gazing on this fresco is a sense of the holy salvation that this cult allows. With Osiris depicted in "such an unreal atmosphere, a sudden, unexpected, and supernatural transition from death to life seems to await Osiris and all who follow his mysteries."[21] This fresco highlights the resurrection of Osiris and its relation to Isis, by demonstrating that these initiates are choosing to follow the deity that made the impossible possible: reversing the seemingly permanent state of death. As mentioned above, it is noteworthy that Osiris is still encased in his sarcophagus and not yet in his earthly form, and that instead of the ribbons being tied tightly around the sarcophagus they appear to be loose and ready to be broken. These aspects of the fresco offer a sense of anticipation and excitement about what the initiates know is about to happen, and again provide evidence as to why they should follow Isis. By studying this fresco, they can imagine this astonishing resurrection and healing process that is about to be completed, and imagine for themselves what it would be like.

**Conclusion**

Similar to how European Roman Catholics created grand stained-glass windows for their churches and cathedrals for the purposes of instruction and adoration, these fresco paintings were meant to have a similar purpose. They portray positive narratives of Isis and Egypt and provide explanations of why the initiates of the Pompeii cult should be dedicated to this deity. Just as Catholic social teaching provides visual images that educate, challenge, and nourish the viewer and "function both as a form of catechesis and as sources for students of…Catholic history,"[22] these frescoes acted as narratives for teaching initiates about the mysteries of Isis. They depict Isis' relationship with other deities such as Io and Osiris, while creating an appealing Roman version of this Egyptian goddess to be consumed by the followers. These frescoes, located in one of the main meeting areas of the temple, the *ekklesiasterion*, demonstrated some of the "deepest and most consoling meaning of the Isis religion…resurrection, redemption, and survival after death in a better world."[23]

[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 162-3.
[22] Joseph F. Chorpenning, "[About the Cover]: Catholic Social Teaching in the Stained Glass," *American Catholic Studies* 115, no. 4 (2004): 80.
[23] Brenk, "Blessed Afterlife in the Mysteries," 163.

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# SECTION 2

## CENTRAL EUROPE: PAST AND PRESENT

**"Potential and Problematics: European Union Enlargement of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 21st Century"**

*Vanesa Simic, DePaul University*

**Bosnia-Herzegovina as EU Periphery**

Despite European Union (EU) integration of multiple countries, many countries in the Balkans region of Europe still lack EU membership. As a result, one focus of the EU has been to integrate these countries, although they have been in EU candidate status for a while and progression has been slow. In terms of the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina specifically, there has been internal disagreement surrounding joining the EU, as the country is composed of three main ethnic groups: Bosnian Muslims, Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs, each of whom have different political concerns and histories impacting their view of the EU. This paper will examine the EU enlargement motivations and efforts to integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina and how internal disagreements within Bosnia-Herzegovina have affected these integration efforts, arguing that ultimately the EU effort to integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina has been unsuccessful due to the expectations placed upon the Balkans by the EU and the continuing ethnic tensions that have exacerbated in recent years.

The Balkan region, while being surrounded by EU Member States, has been viewed as "the EU's backyard" and "the periphery of the periphery," historically not being considered a potential candidate for EU membership.[1] Bosnia-Herzegovina's characterization as the "periphery" is a cause of both the war and the historical presence of socialism, which many European countries have rejected in favor of a democratic capitalistic system. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Bosnian war destabilized the region, resulting in it being often neglected as a potential ally due to concerns about the political tensions within Bosnia-Herzegovina affecting the EU. Much of the involvement in the region on behalf of the EU as well as other organizations such as the UN in the war was initially to contain it within the Balkan region, rather than to put effort toward assisting either party or allowing civilians to immigrate to an EU country.

This region can also be characterized as post-socialist / communist, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, and this characterization continues to influence popular perceptions of the region, as many EU states are capitalist. It was not until after the Cold War and the breakup of Yugoslavia that the Balkans "have been located as a part of the European body politic," indicating the EU's adherence to capitalism and democracy as opposed to the communist system.[2] As a result of communist and socialist countries historically lacking ties with Western Europe which comprises much of the European Union, it can be observed that the EU's impact on developments in post-communist countries "has not been so positive."[3] The criteria for EU membership also promotes a degree of market involvement and production that is not typical of communist and socialist systems. So, many former Yugoslavian states, except Croatia and Slovenia, have not "been able to accomplish post-communist reforms and meet other accession conditions at the level which the EU deems satisfactory for membership."[4] While formerly Communist states, such as

[1] Klodiana Beshku, "The EU as a Geopolitical Power. The Case of the Western Balkans Region as the Periphery to the Core," SSRN, September 28, 2021, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3930115.
[2] Mika Luoma-aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse," *Geopolitics* 7, no. 3 (December 2002): 127, https://doi.org/10.1080/714000968.
[3] Milenko Petrovic, "EU Enlargement into the Western Balkans: A Gloomy Prospect Gets Gloomier," Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, accessed September 16, 2024, https://d-nb.info/1258954346/34.
[4] Ibid.

Russia and Belarus, also lack some involvement, it is increasingly necessary, from the perspective of the EU, to exert some influence in these regions to pull them into its sphere of influence.

**Renewed Interest**

In the late 20th and early 21st Century, the EU did not express interest in integrating certain Balkan States due to the destabilization, as "the region was identified as a zone threatening European security."[5] Therefore, any EU effort in the Balkan states, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, affected by war, was to contain the conflict in that region and protect EU member states, as opposed to attempts to integrate specific countries. The EU largely played a role in facilitating peace-making within the Balkan region as a whole after the war.[6] Even in 2018 when there was a push to integrate more Balkan states, it was framed as a way to ensure the security of the EU.[7] This framing is likely to ensure political turmoil decreases so that the European region, in general, is stable due to the Balkan region being geographically proximate to both EU states and non-EU states such as Russia, allowing for it to be influenced by either side. The spread of, at times violent, nationalism also stirred fear within the EU that it would spread to EU member states.[8] The spread of nationalism to other EU member states would likely result in bodies being unable to operate effectively, with nationalist strife influencing decision-making. As a result, this concern likely impacts the member states' conceptions of the Balkans, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina.

General support among the member states for EU enlargement in the Balkans has been influenced by negative stereotypes of the region being affected by "economic underdevelopment, corruption, non-consolidated democratic systems and tendency to ethnic conflicts."[9] To an extent, this characterization would suggest that integrating the remaining non-member states would bring more unnecessary conflict to the EU. Interest and commitment to the Balkans intensified in 2019, as the President of the EU Commission cited geopolitical concerns such as "US-China rivalries, persistent conflicts in the Middle East and increased geo-economic competition in Africa" that Europe had to face, noting that "relations with Europe's southern and eastern neighborhood will remain tough," acknowledging the potential yet difficulty of the region to bring prosperity to Europe.[10] While states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina have been overlooked, there has been a recent push to integrate these states as conflicts border Europe in Russia and Ukraine. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a candidate for accession, the negative sentiment from EU member states towards Bosnia-Herzegovina's economy and development does impact the rigidity to which the EU criteria are applied and evaluated.

Post-2019, Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to attempt to fulfill the membership requirements given by the EU. A major concern for the EU is the structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitution and government, which allocates representation for each ethnicity. The division of ethnicities is in opposition to the European Convention on Human Rights, and must be reformed before Member Status is granted.[11] The Dayton Accords rested on a "carefully balanced

[5] Beshku, "The EU as a Geopolitical Power," 4.
[6] Ettore Greco, "South-Eastern Europe: The Expanding EU Role," in *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy,* ed. Roland Dannreuther (Routledge, 2004), 68.
[7] Beshku, "The EU as a Geopolitical Power," 5.
[8] Luoma-aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism," 134.
[9] Beshku, "The EU as a Geopolitical Power," 13.
[10] Ibid., 6.
[11] "Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's Application for Membership of the European Union," European Commission, May 29, 2019, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/opinion-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-application-membership-european-union-0_en.

power-sharing agreement," resulting in institutional structures depending "upon the cooperation between different ethnic groups."[12] Considering that the provisions for ethnic divisions were included in the Dayton Accords to end the war, which was caused by the three ethnicities having difficulty coexisting, this appears to be an insurmountable task, at least for the foreseeable future. As the Bosnia-Herzegovinian government depends on these ethnic groups cooperating, and there has been increasing tensions, the government will continue to struggle to create impactful change to abide by EU requirements, further exacerbating tensions.

Acknowledging these tensions, the Commission cites Bosnia-Herzegovina's post-war legacy and the tendency of politicians to continue to deny events recognized by organizations such as the UN, that occurred during the war.[13] As the Commission refers specifically to genocide denial, alluding to Srebrenica, it appears that this criticism is directed toward Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat politicians in particular. The Commission concludes that Bosnia joining the EU, in its current state of affairs, "could negatively affect the decision-making process at the EU level."[14] While this statement indicates that Bosnia-Herzegovina's accession into the EU would bring harm, it does not discuss the strong potential Bosnia-Herzegovina has as a country that is relatively new to democracy and therefore likely has room for experimentation that other countries might not. The negative perception expressed by the Commission likely extends to the member states individually, resulting in the geopolitical desire for the Balkan region to join the EU to prevent non-EU influence and disruption of EU functions.

**Internal Division in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The Bosnia-Herzegovinian leadership, as it is composed of various ethnic groups, also has its concerns with EU membership, particularly as some alliances conflict with the EU. Support for EU Member Status within Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided amongst the three ethnic groups, each of which constitutes a majority in various regions in Bosnia. The Bosnia-Herzegovinian leadership is composed of three representatives, who represent the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, respectively. These groups tend to live in the same area as other group members, as opposed to being dispersed, resulting in the formation of regional politics. The northernmost region of Bosnia-Herzegovina, illustrated in figure 1, which is majority Bosnian-Serb, is referred to as Srpska Republika, or Republic of Serbia, and has its own identity as being Bosnian-Serb and Orthodox, which shapes its opinion on the EU and Europe as a whole.[15] As a result, the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina is partly shaped by the aspirations of the various ethnic groups and is greatly influenced by regional politics. While figure 2 illustrates that Bosniaks and Croats strongly favor succession with a poll showing 88% for Bosniaks and 75% for Croats, it is only slightly favored amongst Serbs at 54%.[16] Additionally, as shown in figure 3, while Bosnia-Herzegovina has experienced economic turmoil with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a slight majority of Serbs, 51%, believe that joining the EU would not accomplish much in alleviating economic difficulties.[17] Therefore, the EU must address these concerns before Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens increase their efforts in pushing for reform that would allow for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be admitted into the EU.

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[12] Greco, "The Expanding EU Role," 71.
[13] "Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's Application for Membership of the European Union."
[14] Ibid.
[15] "Bosnia's Ethnic Divisions, Before and After Dayton," Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, November 13, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/a/lasting-ethnic-divisions-in-bosnia/27363192.html.
[16] "Public Opinion Poll: Bosnia and Herzegovina," National Democratic Institute, October 15, 2019, https://www.ndi.org/publications/public-opinion-poll-bosnia-and-herzegovina.
[17] Ibid.




Figure 1.





Figure 2.





Figure 3.

The sentiment of the three ethnic groups regarding the EU and other European institutions is shaped by their respective histories with European bodies. The Bosnian Serbs, based on politics and religion, typically align with Russia, which is currently in opposition to the EU, exacerbated by the Russo-Ukrainian war. Russia, particularly within recent years, has had increased involvement with far-right Bosnian Serb nationalist groups in particular and is "directly influencing BiH through military tools in supporting the far-right. Paramilitary groups and their connections to the Russian government strengthen the anti-EU and NATO sentiment to exclude BiH from supranational institutions."[18] Outside of military groups, the Russian influence is most apparent in "the pro-Putin protests organized in many cities of Republika Srpska," with Russia "fuelling the nationalist and secessionist current in Bosnia & Herzegovina" through this region.[19] The former Bosnian-Serb President and current President of the Serbian Republic, Milorad Dodik, awarded Russian President Putin with a medal of honor in January 2023, signifying the depth of respect between the Serbian Republic and Russia.[20] This influence, paired with support from some Bosnian Serb politicians, continues to make EU membership contested and could worsen if these groups gain traction in the Serbian Republic. Russia also has an economic relationship with the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Russian presence in its economy is a factor that potentially influences the Bosnian Serbs who said that Bosnia-Herzegovina joining the EU would not improve the economy. Russia had additional plans to expand its influence in the Serb region in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the 2014 South Stream pipeline would have run through the region.[21] This would have strengthened the Russian economic presence in the Serbian Republic, but the pipeline was canceled as a result of EU opposition. In addition to Russia's economic influence

[18] Arlinda Rrustemi, "Far-Right Trends in Southeastern Europe: The Influences of Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania," *Hague Center for Strategic Studies* (2020): 11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24202.
[19] Oana Cristea, "The Western Balkans – An Area of Geopolitical Competition," *The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* 16, no. 1 (2022): 39, https://www.rjsp.politice.ro/sites/default/files/2022-12/VOL.%2016%20NO.1%2C%20Special%20Edition%202022_0.pdf.
[20] Wouter Zweers et al., "Little Substance, Considerable Impact: Russian Influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro," *Clingendael Report* (August 2023): 9, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2023/little-substance-considerable-impact/.
[21] Muhidin Mulalic and Mirsad Karic, "The Western Balkans Geopolitics and Russian Energy Politics," *Epiphany* 7, no. 1 (2014): 107, https://doi.org/10.21533/epiphany.v7i1.87.

waning, Putin has also been less vocal in his discussion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Between 2000 and 2022, Putin's mention of the Balkans in general peaked in 2019, and the country mentioned was not Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Serbia, being mentioned 598 times between 2012 and 2022.[22] However, acknowledging the strong ties Bosnian Serbs have to Serbia, this mention of Serbia likely has the same influence on Bosnian Serbs as it does on Serbians. This is also evidenced as Dodik "has visited Moscow more times than any other European politician" from 2018 to 2023.[23] While Putin did not directly mention the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dodik's consistent interactions with Putin indicate that the Republic values Russia as an ally more than Russia publicly indicates, and that Russia still has a strong influence in the region, whether or not it is a major policy concern for Russia.

As a result of this Russian influence and strained relationship with the EU, many of the people living in majority-Bosnian Serb regions have issues with Bosnia-Herzegovina joining the EU, which is then echoed by their elected officials. This has further been exacerbated by Milorad Dodik, who has been vocal in his opposition to Bosnia-Herzegovina joining the EU. As a result of Dodik's attempts at Constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina, some of which did not follow the EU's criteria for membership, the European Parliament's Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs released a statement urging the EU to impose sanctions on Dodik.[24] The presence of nationalist groups, along with the general sympathy for Russia specific to the Bosnian Serb region is another cause of concern for the EU, especially in terms of the EU's support for Ukraine, which must be addressed before Member Status is given.

The sentiment towards the EU amongst Croats and Bosniaks is generally more positive, albeit with some reservations. The Croats, often identified with Croatia which has been part of the EU since 2013, generally support the potential of Bosnia-Herzegovina joining the EU. Bosnian Croats can receive Croatian citizenship, strengthening their ties to the country, and resulting in a general desire to align with it politically. The general sentiment amongst Bosniaks and their leadership is one of support for membership in the EU, particularly as Bosniaks do not identify with another country as Serbs do with Serbia or Croats with Croatia. However, while polls illustrate a high level of support amongst Croats and Bosniaks for EU succession, "the perception of an unwillingness of the EU to support Bosnia-Herzegovina is rising."[25] Therefore, some of the hesitancy amongst the EU concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina despite its economic and political concerns is detected amongst the Bosnian population, including the Bosniaks and Croats, resulting in doubt of its genuine interest.

The role of the EU in minimizing ethnic discourse is also "reduced by the fact that mistrust in national institutions and the political elite also generates mistrust towards institutions of the EU."[26] There is already a lack of trust towards institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, exacerbated by the post-war anxieties of Bosnians, and this mistrust is heightened by outside European institutions that have not until recently had much of a presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Opinion on accession

[22] Zweers, "Russian Influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro," 13.
[23] Ibid., 21.
[24] "Leading MEPs Urge the EU to 'Finally Impose' Sanctions on Milorad Dodik," European Parliament, accessed September 12, 2024, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/leading-meps-urge-the-eu-to-finally-impo/product-details/20230704DPU36681.
[25] Vedran Dzihic and Angela Wieser, "The Crisis of Expectations – Europeanisation as 'Acquis Démocratique' and Its Limits. The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia," *L'Europe en Formation* 349-350, no. 3 (2008): 83, https://doi.org/10.3917/eufor.349.0081.
[26] Ibid., 94.

can shift depending on current events, as "attitudes towards accession are also to a high degree influenced by symbolic discourses and regional political development."[27] For the EU to demonstrate serious interest in and commitment to the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it must respond to shifting political events and assert its commitment to all three ethnic groups.

**Meeting Member Status**

Bosnia-Herzegovina still has candidate status for EU membership, but progress has been slow as it has been struggling to meet the criteria put forward by the EU. Some of the criteria placed on the Balkan states have also been formulated "with very little respect for the countries' specifics and realistic chances of meeting them."[28] Therefore, despite the criteria being quite unrealistic, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still held to the expectation of fulfilling it, which is to an extent a futile attempt. Regarding the role of the EU, to more successfully integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina, Beshku argues that the general perception of the Balkans must change, as it is still characterized as an unstable region.[29] To accomplish this, she recommends highlighting the economic potential of the region, namely in terms of "its renewable energy sources, transit routes for gas and world commerce, young labor force, and 18 million consumers" amongst a multitude of other factors.[30]

By highlighting the Balkan region's potential, EU member states can more earnestly support the membership aspirations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in turn, emphasize the potential of the EU to bring economic reform to Bosnia-Herzegovina so that the concerns of Bosnians are alleviated. As nationalist strife is exacerbated in times of economic turmoil, further financial support for Bosnia-Herzegovina can provide an, albeit small, way to diffuse tensions.[31] Another possibility for the EU to extend support for Bosnia-Herzegovina highlighting the renewable energy sources mentioned by Beshku, is to promote renewable energy development in the region. Specifically, the EU can take up a role in "supporting non-EU member states decarbonizing their economies and investing in climate change measures."[32] However, this aspect is only supplementary and does not address the core issue of ethnic tensions, as well as the Bosnian perception of the EU, and the EU's perception of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In terms of the EU's perception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the opinion is quite divided between the EU as a body and some member states. The spokesperson for Victor Orban, the Hungarian President, while currently advocating for expedited accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other Balkan states, tweeted in 2021 that "the challenge with Bosnia is how to integrate a country with 2 million Muslims."[33] Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the only countries in Europe with a Muslim population not primarily composed of immigrants or children of immigrants, and therefore Islam is a strong cultural component in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, similarly received backlash for his 2019 speech where he referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina as the "time-bomb that's ticking right next to Croatia, and which faces the problem of returning jihadists."[34] Macron, in addition to assuming that Bosnia-Herzegovina is rife with

[27] Ibid.
[28] Petrovic, "EU enlargement into the Western Balkans," 12.
[29] Beshku, "The EU as a Geopolitical Power," 16.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Luoma-Aho, "Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism," 132.
[32] Cristea, "Western Balkans," 38.
[33] Amer Cohadzic, "Hungary's PM Denounced in Bosnia for Anti-Muslim Rhetoric," AP, December 22, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/business-religion-europe-sarajevo-viktor-orban-431e51735fbbb9761d2007d9083f8aee.
[34] David M. Herszenhorn, "Diplomatic Blow-up after Macron Calls Bosnia a 'Ticking Time-Bomb,'" Politico, November 9, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-bosnia-ticking-time-bomb/.

religiously-motivated terrorism, is referring to "jihadists" who fought with Bosniak Muslims during the war, and therefore is conceptualizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as not moving forward from its past, rather than discussing the potential of Bosnia-Herzegovina with EU assistance. Further exacerbating ethnic tensions, Milorad Dodik commended Macron's remarks, noting that he is one of the few willing to discuss "the true threats of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina."[35] By focusing on the threat of terrorism that occurred in the 90s and not encouraging Bosnian-Herzegovinians to minimize ethnic tensions, Macron inadvertently provided further support to Bosnian Serbs and ostracized Bosnian Muslims, further driving them away from the EU. Despite the EU expressing concern over islamophobia against Bosniak Muslims occurring within the country, some heads of EU states, whether intentionally or not, reflect those same Islamophobic beliefs.

With the EU acknowledging ethnic divisions, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has recently reasserted the need for Bosnia-Herzegovina to "speak with one voice and move forward as one" and that "backsliding on divisions in any part" of Bosnia-Herzegovina is unacceptable.[36] This statement exemplifies the acknowledgment of the EU that ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to affect its ability to develop politically. As various actors have risen to continue exacerbating conflict, this ethnic conflict continues to be a major roadblock in terms of EU accession. While von der Leyen does discuss the improvement of the economy, the ethnic division in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still the primary cause for concern. As global crises, such as the war in Ukraine, intensify and the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to aspire towards opposing directions, this is likely to remain an obstacle to accession. The rise of regional nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether in the Republic of Serbia or elsewhere, continues to challenge its stability, making it unlikely that membership conditions will be met soon.

## Conclusion

While the Balkan region has been destabilized due to ethnic conflicts and an economy in turmoil, the potential it presents as a buffer against Russia and its influence is insurmountable to the EU, particularly as the war in Ukraine intensifies. However, the EU's effort to integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina has been unsuccessful due to Bosnia-Herzegovina's struggle to meet the requirements. Much of the EU's criteria contradicts the core of Bosnia-Herzegovinian governance, and any attempts to reform this will be extensive and lengthy, requiring a complete overhaul of the governmental structure. The ethnic divisions and the legacy of the war itself continue to have a hold on Bosnians, with politicians manipulating this to gain support for their own aspirations. These ethnic tensions additionally drive Bosnian Serbs in particular to more strongly ally themselves with Russia. As ethnic tensions between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs continue to rise, there is potential for the EU to further invest in the region and illustrate to all three groups the potential it can have in alleviating conflict, although this is unlikely to occur within the next decade. Part of this difficulty is the fault of the EU, with the requirements being exceptionally difficult to achieve within a country that is continuing to recover from war, and several Presidents of EU states making disparaging comments towards Bosnian Muslims. While the EU has a responsibility to provide support to Bosnia-Herzegovina in meeting accession requirements through reform, it also has a requirement to improve the perceptions of EU member states' leaders

[35] Ibid.

[36] "Statement by President von Der Leyen at the Joint Press Conference with Borjana Krišto, Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina," European Commission, November 1, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_5481.

of Bosnia-Herzegovina, viewing it as not a war-torn country but rather a country of people who have survived war and hope to build a new government that can support them in rebuilding their lives.

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**"Local History and Changes in Space Recorded in Toponymy and Microtoponymy: The Example of Korniaktów Południowy Village"**

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Korniaktów Południowy is a small village which is a part of Białobrzegi Borough and Łańcut County. It is located in the central part of the Podkarpackie Province, in south-east Poland. This article will discuss local geographical names within the administrative boundaries of the village. These names can be divided according to the characteristics of the object or the features of the area. Toponyms refer not only to environmental features, such as surface topography or soil type – but also refer to local history, indicating which places were particularly important to the local people. They refer to their way of life, their occupations or the names of fields as well as farm owners.

In the past, local names helped to name and domesticate a space. As a rule, the information contained in a name was understandable only to the narrow community of a particular village – to outsiders it could look peculiar, alien or even have a pejorative character.

Nowadays, collecting a corpus of names is important because some of them are losing their importance and are slowly becoming forgotten - only the oldest people in the village remember them. This is because the functions to which the names refer to are no longer significant to the existence of the village community in space or no material trace of them remains. The collection and analysis of geographical names can save them from being forgotten for future generations. This is an important aspect because in this way the unique cultural landscape of the countryside will not be lost.

This article aims to outline the diverse toponymic landscape of the village of Korniaktów Południowy, paying attention to the spatial imagination of the people living there and their ways of telling stories about space and the past. The data on toponyms was obtained both through field research using the semi-structured interview method and from regional literature describing the history of the village and the surrounding area. The first method has provided much more intriguing information and histories, but few have been able to refer to written sources.

**Location and History of Korniaktów Południowy Village**

Korniaktów Południowy is a village located in Białobrzegi borough, Łańcut County, in the central part of Podkarpackie Voivodeship (about 30 kilometres east from Rzeszów). Korniaktów Południowy is the smallest village of the borough in terms of area – its size is 3.21 $km^2$, which accounts for 5.71% of the borough's territory. The administrative boundaries of the village have changed over the years but since the beginning of the 20th century, they have been constant.




Figure 1. Location of Korniaktów Południowy on the map of Poland.

According to Kondracki, the physical-geographical regionalisation can be concluded that Korniaktów Południowy is located in the Sandomierz Basin macro-region, on the border of two mesoregions: Podkarpacka Proglacial Valley and Rzeszowskie Foothills. The greater part of the village is located in the Podkarpacka Proglacial Valley, whose bed flows in the eastern direction along the Wisłok River. Korniaktów Południowy is located on flat land with small local depressions and hills - some of them were created naturally and some were connected to human activity. The relief is not very diverse. Differences in altitude are within a few metres. A characteristic element of the landscape is the Wisłok River, whose erosive and accumulative activities have largely contributed to the current appearance of the area closest to the neighbourhood of the valley.

The Wisłok River is the natural boundary separating Korniaktów Południowy from Korniaktów Północny (the village on the other bank of the river). In the past, the river changed its riverbed and repeatedly emerged from its banks flooding the surrounding area and depositing sediment. Currently, the riverbed still undergoes slight changes, but floods do not happen very often. The Wisłok is also one of the factors influencing the naming processes in Korniaktów Południowy.

Near the southern and eastern parts of the village runs a network of deep irrigation canals draining water from the surrounding fields into the Wisłok. The water level in them depends on atmospheric conditions (amount and duration of rainfall). It has happened that at high water levels on the Wislok and during prolonged rainfall, the drainage ditches have posed a flood risk (for example, during the flood in June 2010).

## History of the Founding and Development of the Village

Korniaktów was founded in the mid-16th century by the Greek merchant Konstantin Korniakt. The first settlers were shepherds brought from Hungary, who came to the village every year with their flocks. They were hesitant to change their lifestyle from nomadic to sedentary.[1] The first years of the village were characterised by frequent conflicts resulting from disputes between neighbouring estate owners. Korniaktów was plundered and residential as well as economic buildings were burnt down.

A little over 100 years later, the Korniaktów family (descended from Konstanty Korniakt) died out and the village passed into the possession of other noble families. In the following years Korniaktów changed owners many times. In the 18th century the village belonged to the Lubomirski family – then the Lords of Lancut. In the middle of the 19th century Korniaktów was attached to the entail property of the Potocki family.[2]

During the First World War the village itself did not suffer too much. Local men took part in the military actions taking place in the country, while women and children worked on the farms.

Around 1920 Korniaktów was divided into two parts, which were then assigned to the newly established parishes in the area. The southern part of the village, on the right side of the Wislok River, was incorporated into the parish of Białobrzegi. The northern part was attached in 1921 to the parish of Budy Łańcuckie.[3] However, this was not yet an administrative division. The village of Korniaktów was divided into two separate villages later.

During World War II the village was not destroyed, but the local population did not escape oppression. Particularly oppressive was the system of forced quotas, that is, the obligation to hand over a certain amount of grain, vegetables, livestock products or straw and hay. Another type of quota involved people being deported to forced labour in Germany. The German occupation ended in the summer of 1944.

In the 1960s Korniaktów was administratively divided into two separate villages - Korniaktów Północny and Korniaktów Południowy. The division of the village was already evident due to its belonging to different parishes. Since then, the village has developed in terms of buildings and technical infrastructure, but the territory has not changed any more.

## Toponyms and Micro-toponyms – Functions and Circumstances of Origin

Geographical names form a subset of proper names. They are studied by onomastics, a science that relates to several scientific disciplines. In addition, it also focuses on the whole naming activity. Thus, onomastics mainly focuses on "explaining the origin and meaning of proper names, by methods taken from etymology, analysing their structure and classification."[4]

Onomastics can be divided into two groups based on the object of study – these are anthroponomastics and toponomastics. Toponomastics deals with toponyms, that is, local or geographical names. We can divide toponyms into groups based on the characteristics of the object or the characteristics of the area to which the name refers (e.g. water names, mountain names or settlement names). Among these are microtoponyms, which explore "field names, such as fields, grasslands and small landforms, functioning in rural linguistic communities."[5]

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[1] Waldemar Ostrowski, *To moja ziemia – program i skrypt edukacji regionalnej* (Budy Łańcuckie, 2002), 32.
[2] Ibid., 35.
[3] Henryk Borcz, *Z przeszłości kościołów i parafii Kosina, Miejscowość i parafia Kosina* (Przemyśl-Kosina, 2020), 181.
[4] Andrzej Czerny, *Teoria nazw geograficznych* (Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN, 2011), 14.
[5] Ibid., 15.

Microtoponyms have the least permanence of all geographical names. They refer to relatively small objects. They function mainly in oral circulation among local residents, which affects their impermanence and variability over time.[6] Microtoponyms are generally non-official names. They may occur in colloquial language in different linguistic variants referring to the same place.

Some of the names in Korniaktów Południowy have survived in practically unchanged form since the 19th century and the early 20th century. Some were created relatively recently – in the 1980s and 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. Microtoponyms refer to inhabited and uninhabited parts of the village, as well as to individual objects, distinguished from the rural space by a characteristic feature or form of use.

Microtoponyms have various functions. They allow specific places and objects to be specified from space. They facilitate orientation in the area, especially taking into account the fact that in Korniaktów Południowy, as in many other villages, street names have still not been introduced. The names of parts of the village also give a sense of belonging to a smaller, closer neighbourhood community. Microtoponyms were, or still are, important to the residents of an area for various reasons. Most often, the name reflects the appearance of a place, refers to a form of land use now or in the past, draws attention to a characteristic feature (e.g. type of soil, place to which a road leads), or identifies a location in relation to other parts of the village or neighbouring villages.

**Examples of Microtoponyms in Korniaktów Południowy**

1. Bycze Jajo (Bull's Egg)

Bycze Jajo or Bull's Egg is the inhabited part of the village, located near the Wisłok River. Various versions of the origin of the name occurred during the field research. Unfortunately, none of them have been described in the literature, so only oral accounts can be relied upon. According to one of them, the described area was covered with grass. These were ideal conditions for grazing cattle. On the other bank of the river, due to the poor quality of the soil, grass did not grow as much, and grazing was severely hampered. When the village belonged to the owners of Łańcut, cattle were driven through Korniaktów Południowy to be sold. While grazing they were enclosed in egg-shaped pens. The inhabitants named what they saw directly, which is why the name was created from the shape of the pens and the species of animals in them.

According to another version, this pasture was shaped like an egg. This version, however, seems less likely, as there were similar pastures in other villages and yet the name was preserved only in Korniaktów Południowy. The boundaries of this part of the village are conventional – there is no clearly defined division.

Over the years the name has acquired a pejorative meaning. It has a bad connotation and does not sound very elegant. This is the reason why the name is slowly being discontinued by the local community. The residents of Bycze Jajo are increasingly identifying themselves with other names in the immediate vicinity. Inside the Bycze Jajo is a small, inhabited area, referred to by locals as Sycamore Hill or, for a shorter time, just Hill.

2. Jaworowa Górka (Sycamore Hill)

The name is associated with two characteristics of the area. Firstly, it is the highest situated area in the whole village (but due to the flat nature of the terrain this hill is only a few metres high). Therefore, in the minds of the villagers it functions as the Hill, although it does not really have anything to do with a mountain or foothill. Secondly, according to interviews, until the 1980s a

[6] Czerny, *Teoria nazw geograficznych*, 39.

huge sycamore tree grew on this hill, which was later cut down. The combination of these two features gave rise to the name Jaworowa Górka or Sycamore Hill. Over time, the memory of the large tree began to fade, and, at the same time, residents began to use a shortened version of Gorka, without reference to the trees. Unlike Bycze Jajo, the name is not pejoratively characterised, but it is also in danger of being forgotten because of how small the area it refers to is.

3. Zakarczmie (Behind-inn)

The name Zakarczmie is associated with a building used by local people and travellers in the time before the Second World War. An inn was a building that served as a meeting place. It was possible to have a meal there, drink alcoholic beverages or stay the night. It was also a place where various dance and music events were held. The part of the village in question was located in the area directly behind the inn. The name is related to the location of the area in connection with the inn. There is a local legend associated with Zakarczmie. We learn from it that as a result of unfortunate events bordering between reality and the fantasy world, the inn located in this part of the village burned down in a fire. One day, a tree next to the building was struck by lightning, from which the fire spread to the inn. "After less than an hour, what was left of the inn were some unburned beams, a bare kitchen hearth of brick and clay, some ashes, and the later name of the hamlet of Zakarczmie."[7] The name is not pejorative. It is used universally by villagers and refers to a relatively large part of the village. As a result, the name is not in danger of being forgotten in the coming years.

4. Gliniane (Clay)

This name refers to a part of the village where the farmland also has a microtoponymic name. The name is related to the dominant type of soil found in the area. It is difficult to say when exactly the name was created – at the time of the field interviews no one was able to indicate even an approximate date. In a slightly modified form, the name is recorded on a map as early as the mid-19th century. The names of the cultivated areas are not sophisticated. They carry simple information – about the type of soil or possibly the conditions affecting the cultivation of crops in the area.

5. Droga na prom (Ferry Road)

This name refers to the road leading to the ferry crossing over the Wisłok River. It does not refer to a part of the village but to a linear element. The exact date when the ferry crossing started is not known, but it is estimated that it could have been between the 16th and 17th centuries. It was probably then that the name was created. In the beginning, the Ferry Road took a different route to the river than it does today – residents took a less muddy route.

The ferry was actively used until 1996 until a decision was made to close it. Transport to the other side of the river was and is made possible by two bridges located in neighbouring villages. To this day, the section of road that led down the riverbed to the ferry has become completely overgrown with grass. There is virtually no trace left of the former descent. The only elements that have survived are the foundations of the ferryman's shed and the foundation to which the rope used to operate the ferry was attached. Despite the passage of almost 30 years since it closure, the name Ferry Road is still commonly used by villagers, especially those who still had the opportunity to use the ferry as the only option for getting to the other side of the river. It is possible that a bridge will be built on the site of the former crossing in the near future, eventually connecting this village to the other on the opposite side.

[7] Janina Pelc, *Legendy i gawędy spod korniaktowskiej strzechy* (Edytorial, 2019), 208.



Figure 2. Ferry Road from the side of the Wislok River (1980s). (Photograph from Socha family archive).



Figure 3: Ferry Road from the side of the Wislok River (April 2023). (Photograph by Anna Brodowicz).

6. Droga kościelna (Church Road)

The Church Road is a route between farmland, leading to the parish church in Kosina (the nearest village with a church located near Korniaktów Południowy). The inhabitants of Korniaktów Południowy used it to shorten a little the way to the church, which they usually travelled to on foot. Sometimes the name Church Path was also used.

The first information about the Kosina church as the parish church of Korniaktów's inhabitants dates to 1727. At that time, the village had not yet been divided into two communes, so the faithful living on the left bank of the Wisłoka River also belonged to the parish. The church road was used until Korniaktów belonged to the parish in Kosina. In 1920, a church was built in Białobrzegi, and the part of Korniaktów located on the right bank of the river was attached to the parish there. In 1921 a church was built in Budy Łańcuckie, and the part of Korniaktów situated on the left bank of the river was attached to this parish.[8] Białobrzegi and Budy Łańcuckie are villages directly adjacent to Korniaktów Południowy.

This is another example of a linear landscape element. In this case, the name has almost been forgotten. Only the oldest villagers know it. The name has fallen out of use because the road has lost its function – it is no longer essential and necessary for the functioning of the local community.

**Summary and Conclusions**

For a non-resident, microtoponyms usually have little or no meaning. They can often evoke the wrong associations or sound ridiculous. For the local community, these names are quite ordinary. They were created to tame their surroundings and to gain an orientation in the area. They are not intended to commemorate momentous events. Sometimes, with the development of the language, microtoponyms have been slightly changed in spelling, even taking on a pejorative character.

The history of small fragments of a village is recorded in the microtoponyms. It is often the only legacy of a former function, activity or use. Some stories are easy to reconstruct and are well-known. Others sometimes take the form of a legend, with elements of the fantastic world or folklore. Such stories cannot be regarded as a fully reliable source, but they are not entirely devoid

[8] Borcz, *Z przeszłości kościołów i parafii Kosina, Miejscowość i parafia Kosina*, 181.

of value. They are part of the tradition of a rural community. As a result, they have their own charm and, despite everything, may contain crumbs of truth.

The field names in Korniaktów Południowy refer to the reality in which earlier generations of inhabitants lived. Sections of roads that led to important – from the perspective of those people – objects had names that directly spoke of the destination. In the local community, especially among those born up to the 1980s, the road through Zakarczmie to the Wisłok River is still the "Ferry Road." The ferry closed over twenty years ago, the drive down the riverbed has been overgrown for a long time, and only foundational remnants remain of the former infrastructure necessary for the crossing. Despite this, the name is still in use. In all likelihood, it will disappear from the language of the inhabitants in a decade or so. People born in the 1990s and later do not remember the working crossing – they know it only from stories. This is why writing down folk tales and stories passed on by oral tradition is so important. Otherwise, the names that bear witness to the history and describe the landscape of a village will be forgotten and it will be virtually impossible to recreate them.

Nowadays, microtoponyms are losing their importance. Names for parts of the village are still used because most Korniaktów Południowy residents identify with them as a more precise place to live. Names referring to distinctive places are by far the least permanent. The oldest generations are able to point to their location or say what their name is associated with. They have always been in their language, in common use. Among younger people, these names are disappearing because they do not serve as landmarks in the landscape. They are known only from the stories of their grandparents, and, with the passing of time, they blend in more and more with the village landscape.

An additional element that can help to reconstruct the former village landscape are photographs. Particularly interesting are the contrasts between old photographs from several decades ago and the current ones. This is the best illustration of the changes taking place in the landscape. They also explain why names are disappearing from use - the elements to which they referred to are no longer distinctive in the village landscape. They no longer perform important functions; rather, they are associated with a matter of habit or sentiment.

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# SECTION 3

## CHALLENGES IN DEMOCRACY

**"Torture and the Evolution of Muscovite Law"**
*Daniel Wiltse, Macalester College*

During the late 15th to mid-16th century, Muscovy transformed from a local principality into an expansive empire. As this expansion occurred, rulers recognized the need to make the judicial system more efficient and wide-reaching. They also adapted Muscovite law to meet the needs of governing a large territory of diverse people. Despite the changes, torture persisted as a tool in the administration of justice. Every major legal document from 1497 to 1649 sanctioned the use of torture to solve judicial cases, although its role changed over time. This makes judicial torture in Muscovite laws a good gradient to study the evolution of the judicial system.[1] As early Muscovite legal codes evolved in complexity from 68 articles of the *1497 Sudebnik* to the 968 articles of the *1649 Ulozhenie* the use of torture became more expansive. The *1497 Sudebnik* mentioned torture only once, simply mandating that thieves should be tortured to discover their accomplices. The *Ulozhenie*, by contrast, contained the word "torture" 147 times, covering a myriad of applications ranging from verifying the ancestry of serfs to interrogating corrupt bailiffs. The expanding use of torture shows the Muscovite state refining the legal system into a tool to gain increased control over society. Whereas the legal processes in the *1497 Sudebnik*, torture among them, simply facilitated conflict resolution between subjects, torture in the *Ulozhenie* gave the state the authority to use the law to achieve state interests.

Between the 13th and 15th centuries, a Mongol successor state known as the Golden Horde ruled the territories that comprise modern-day Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The Horde controlled the Rus principalities through a system of tribute and fealty which has been labeled the Tatar Yoke. Under this system, the princes were required to pay tribute and provide military support to the Horde but were granted a large degree of autonomy. This autonomy enabled the princes of Muscovy to amass considerable power, which allowed them to repulse a Mongol incursion in 1480, marking the end of the Rus subordination to the Horde.[2]

With their independence firmly secured, the Grand Princes of Muscovy pursued legal reform by introducing the *Sudebniks* of 1497 and 1550. The first of these documents laid the groundwork for a legal system based mostly on fines and court fees while the second filled in many of the gaps of the first and widened judicial reach to cover areas of criminal law. Both legal codes sanctioned the use of torture to extract and verify confessions.[3]

Torture was needed because witness testimony was the main source of evidence. The Muscovite legal system and its European contemporaries recognized the fundamental problem with witness testimony—it was hearsay without appropriate corroborating evidence. This was particularly problematic at the time because early modern legal systems, including that of the Muscovite state, did not possess the resources or capacity to conduct thorough investigations. As an alternative, European states turned to torture to verify testimony and confessions. Prominent religious narratives throughout Europe posited that truth was physically present inside a person and pain was a way to extract it. Whether the Muscovites were influenced by the European

[1] Richard Hellie, ed., *Readings for Introduction to Russian Civilization*, *Muscovite Society* (University of Chicago, 1967), 302.
[2] Valerie A. Kivelson and Ronald Grigor Suny, *Russia's Empires* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 42.
[3] "Sudebnik 1497 goda," Muzei istorii rossiiskikh reform imeni P. A. Stolypina, accessed September 16, 2024, http://museumreforms.ru/node/13625.

narrative or developed ideas about truth and pain independently from indigenous church codes is unclear, but the results were the same.[4]

The Muscovites included torture in the *1497 Sudebnik* but in a narrow way. Article 14 simply states that "whomever a thief shall accuse, he shall be interrogated; if the accused has in the past been charged with theft, and supporting evidence given, he shall be tortured on accusation of theft."[5] This article stipulated that torture could only be used if the accused person had been charged with theft in the past and there was some evidence to support the charge. It also only applied to people implicated by someone already accused of theft. The thief was not tortured. If they were caught red-handed then he is presumed guilty and punished.[6] If another citizen accused them of theft and they denied it, the case would be resolved by the accuser and thief through trial by combat, where "they shall fight in the field about arson, murder, brigandage, or theft, then the sum at issue is to be levied from the loser."[7] Civil cases were settled in the same way.[8]

In this arrangement, the state acted merely as a mediator. A boyar (nobleman) and his secretary oversaw the combat and were compensated in legal fees paid by the losing party.[9] In both civil and criminal law the state oversaw the case rather than decided it. Furthermore, the state did not monopolize the use of violence. Citizens themselves used violence to settle the case. This is indicative of a state largely indifferent to the ramifications of crime. The law was used to settle disputes rather than to mitigate the societal repercussions of crime.

These early legal reforms were largely voided when Ivan IV founded the Oprichnina, putting a third of Russia outside the jurisdiction of the laws he just created.[10] After Ivan's death, he was succeeded by his feeble-minded son Feodor, who proved a weak ruler and didn't produce any heirs. The Rurikid dynasty died out with Feodor in 1598, necessitating a tsar be chosen without an immediate claim to the throne. A complex selection process eventually led to Feodor's brother-in-law Boris Godunov being crowned Tsar. When Godunov died in 1605 a pretender, who claimed to be Ivan IV's dead son Dmitrii, seized power. This led to a succession crisis with additional pretenders who posed as Dmitrii claiming the throne. Political turmoil made Muscovy vulnerable to Cossack rebellions and invasions by Poland and Sweden. A massive public mobilization eventually created an army capable of stabilizing the country, which allowed the Assembly of the Land (Zemskii Sobor) to appoint a young Michael Romanov as tsar in 1613.[11]

With order restored in 1613, sporadic legal reforms, which were often only implemented on a regional scale or by illegitimate governments, resulted in a legal system with major gaps and inconsistences. Surprisingly, when comprehensive legal reform did occur, it came at the behest of Muscovite citizens rather than government initiative. On June 1, 1648, riots broke out in Moscow and over a dozen other towns against a corrupt political clique led by Boris Ivanovich Morozov which exercised considerable influence over the 20-year-old Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. One of the most blatant abuses of the Morozov clique involved initiating frivolous lawsuits that took advantage of legal irregulates to exhort ordinary citizens. Morozov's economic policy, including

[4] Nancy Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 134.
[5] "Sudebnik."
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Kivelson and Suny, *Russia's Empires*, 50.
[11] Ibid., 59.

wage cuts to public workers and a burdensome salt tax, also spurred unrest. The rioters submitted a petition outlining grievances against the government, one of which was the lack of codified law.[12]

The government was surprisingly responsive and quickly organized a commission to codify the law. All things considered, the creation of the *Ulozhenie* was a relatively democratic process that represented the will of the people. Following the rioters' explicit demands, the Zemskii Sobor ratified the code. The Zemskii Sobor was a two-chambered legislative body composed of people from various social classes. The upper chamber consisted of high-ranking clergy and government officials. The lower chamber was filled with lower-ranking officials and townsmen.[13] While the Zemskii Sobor was far from representative, it allowed citizens of various social ranks to participate in the drafting of and ultimately the signing of the *Ulozhenie*. There was also public trust in the Zemskii Sobor, made evident by the request of the rioters that it ratify the law. It was drafted as a concession to rioting citizens and was ratified by a legislative body. For these reasons the contents of the *Ulozhenie* should be interpreted as a result of national consensus rather than a decree from an impartial monarch.

In the *Ulozhenie*, the use of torture and violence was quite different that in the earlier *Sudebniks*. Torture was now used much more extensively and applied differently in civil and criminal cases. Furthermore, the state now monopolized the use of violence in legal proceedings. Trial by combat was no longer used to decide cases. Through these changes the Muscovite state used the law to gain greater control over its expanding territory and increasingly diverse population.

In civil cases, torture became a supplemental means of proving guilt and innocence.[14] Suits were increasingly resolved with third-party testimony, which was not necessarily subject to verification by torture. The defendant in such cases had the right to demand a general investigation (*poval'nyi obysk*), in which around one hundred or more local people from a wide variety of professions would be interviewed by government investigators under oath about their opinion on the suit. The majority opinion often decided the outcome.[15] The losing party could challenge the decision, which triggered a second round of questioning – this time of the "worthiest men" from both parties. If the investigators concluded that the original majority lied, a fine was extracted from them scaled to the person's profession. These ranged from archimandrites (high-ranking church officials) paying 50 rubles and peasants paying 1 ruble.[16] Torture finally entered the proceedings if the minority party still disputed the majority opinion. In that case, the minority party could voluntarily subject themselves to torture to prove they were telling the truth, which would mean the majority party committed perjury.[17] The person who chose to be tortured was able to collect a maiming fee from the other side if his confession, backed up by the torture, proves they were lying.[18] This process represented an interesting progression of the role of torture in civil litigation. While torture was still present it was only used as a last and optional resort. In this application, we also see the people gain agency over torture. They can choose to be tortured if they think it will benefit them.

[12] Richard Hellie, "Early Modern Russian Law: The Ulozhenie of 1649," *Russian History* 15, no. 2/4 (1988): 163.
[13] Richard Hellie, "Ulozhenie Commentary — Preamble," *Russian History* 15, no. 2/4 (1988): 198.
[14] Richard Hellie, ed., *The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649. Part 1* (Charles Schlacks Jr., 1988), 55.
[15] Ibid., 57.
[16] Ibid., 57-8.
[17] Ibid., 58.
[18] Ibid., 57.

In the prosecution of theft and robbery, torture was prevalent but not universal. Thieves accused of robbery by other citizens were tortured even without proper evidence.[19] The general investigation was utilized in felony proceedings, but its role was inverse to civil suits. If a person was accused of theft or robbery, they were first tortured and if they maintained their innocence, an investigation was called in which community members were questioned following the practice described above.[20] If they pled guilty, they were still tortured about other thefts or robberies they may have committed. The more robberies a person previously committed, the harsher the punishment they would receive. Three thefts or two robberies elicited the death penalty. The process for people implicated by others during torture was slightly less violent. In these cases, a general investigation was called prior to torture, like the prerequisites in the *1497 Sudebnik*.[21] This was the case unless multiple people testified against someone, in which case the investigation was skipped.[22] In the *Ulozhenie*, vagrants occupied a unique position in these cases since they didn't belong to a community, so an investigation based on community questioning could not be conducted. If a vagrant was implicated in a crime he was immediately tortured.[23] Class distinctions were also made. If three robbers implicated a "distinguished person," the person in question was entitled to a general investigation—if they were proven guilty as the result of the investigation, they were subject to three rounds of torture, if they confessed, they were executed.[24] In this case there was a higher bar to clear, in the form of three accusers rather than two, but they were held to a higher standard, being subject to three rounds of torture if convicted by the investigation.

In the use of torture to prosecute common felonies, the state became much more involved in prosecuting these crimes. Where in the *Sudebnik* theft and robbery cases were handled by trial by combat, they were now settled with state-administered torture. If a private citizen killed a thief, they had to go to great lengths, including exhibiting the corpse to neighbors within an hour and registering the corpse with a felony chancellery, to avoid a fine. Torturing thieves was illegal for private citizens and punished with fines which were given to the thief.[25] The state now possessed a monopoly on violence, and felony proceedings were the jurisdiction of the felony chancellery.

Torture was most prevalent in cases involving state interests, most notably the illicit sale of tobacco and alcohol. For example, if a person was caught with illicit alcohol and implicated the person who sold it to them, but the seller did not confess, both would be tortured. If both stick to their stories, more rounds of torture would follow, in which anyone possibly involved in the trade—such as the suppliers for the tavern—would be tortured.[26] In this process there was no need for evidence or an investigation. An accused could be tortured based solely on the testimony of others. The Muscovite state investigated the illicit sale of alcohol so aggressively and punished it so severely because it held a monopoly over vodka sales, which made it approximately 250,000 rubles annually throughout the 1640s, constituting an astounding 25% of state revenue.[27] Any sales of illicit alcohol would undermine this monopoly, reducing the government's income. The threat of violence was used to protect the monopoly and the state's financial interests.

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[19] Ibid., 196-197.
[20] Ibid., 199.
[21] Ibid., 201.
[22] Ibid., 202.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 215.
[26] Ibid., 225.
[27] Dmitry Liseitsev, "Tavern Revenues and Alcohol Consumption in The Muscovite State in Mid-Seventeenth Century," SSRN, January 31, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3528251.

The sale of tobacco was punished even more severely. Tobacco was banned in Russia in 1627 due to economic concerns about it causing a trade deficit with England.[28] To enforce this ban, the *Ulozhenie* prescribed the death penalty to anyone caught in possession of tobacco.[29] The *Ulozhenie* prescribed severe torture in tobacco cases so the state could determine how the criminal had obtained the illicit tobacco. In cases where the convict testified that they purchased tobacco from Lithuanians, they would be tortured to confirm the ethnicity of their supplier. If they had what was deemed a "large quantity" of tobacco they would be tortured yet again.[30] This article specifically targeting Lithuanian sources of tobacco indicates Muscovy's long border with Lithuania was hard to control. Without the capacity to stop the transport of tobacco across the border the state relied on the threat of severe violence to deter illegal sales and thereby protect its economic interests. The policy goal was to prohibit tobacco to maximize net exports in accordance with wing mercantilist economic policy.

In the *Ulozhenie* violence was used as a tool to control society. It was the government's most potent deterrent and means of inquisition. In civil cases, which were of little consequence to the government, torture was only present as an optional means of resolving general investigations. In the case of theft and robbery, which the government had an interest in preventing, torture was prevalent but restricted. In cases of state interest, however, torture and violence were nearly limitless. Torture was deployed without restraint in the investigation of alcohol and tobacco related crimes, and the death penalty for first time offenders was the strongest possible deterrent.

The changes to Muscovite legal codes examined in this paper would have significant implications to the future development of the state. The period between the first *Sudebnik* and the *Ulozhenie* corresponds to the early modern period. During this time, the foundations for many modern states were built. While the delegates to the Zemskii Sobor were debating the contents of the *Ulozhenie*, the English parliament was in open revolt against the king—a revolt that created a new social contract that limited the power of the monarchy. A social contract that would influence England's development as a modern nation. The riots that took place on the streets of Moscow on June 1, 1648, led to a new social contract in Muscovy, but it was a very different social contract than the one in England. Instead of being dispersed, state power was centralized. Rather than bogged down with parliamentary debates, the authority of the Tsar struck as hard and fast as a torturer's whip. All this was done in accordance with the rioters' demand for order and predictability. The people accepted the increase of government power, so long as that power brought about order and predictability. The *Ulozhenie* was not solely responsible for the creation of this social contract, but it codified policies—including the expanded use of torture—that enshrined this new relationship between the government and the people. This social contract survived many challenges and revisions until it expired in March 1917 with the abdication of the last Russian Tsar.

[28] Matthew Romaniello and Tricia Starks, *Tobacco in Russian History and Culture: The Seventeenth Century to the Present* (Routledge, 2011), 11.
[29] Hellie, ed., *The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649*, 228.
[30] Ibid.

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# SECTION 4

## CHERNOBYL MEMORY MUSEUM

**"The Importance of Context: An Example of Growing Perspective"**
*Madelena Lapinski, University of Pittsburgh*

I have been grateful to have the opportunity to learn more about the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl and its lasting impact. We spent some time looking at creative works, including poetry and art, which I found particularly interesting. I decided to use this as inspiration to curate a found poem: one made of lines borrowed from a variety of the poems we encountered. Then, I created an artwork of my own inspired by it. After considering the importance of the concept of "participant photography" and its application to this style of art, I felt the poem was a necessary element to acknowledge the words of people who experienced all that we learned about. I titled my final project, *The Importance of Context: An Example of Growing Perspective*, as it addresses how my perspective on the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl changed as my knowledge broadened.

For the found poem, I used phrases from many of Liubov Sirota's *Chernobyl Poems*, Maria Takolander's "Re-visiting Chernobyl," Martha Silano's "The Wild Horses of Chernobyl," Jennifer Atkinson's "At The Chernobyl Power Plant Eco-reserve," Valzhyna Mort's "Nocturne for a Moving Train," and Lina Kostenko's "Chernobyl Poems."[1] For the artwork, I worked on sketchbook paper and used mostly blue ink pens and some colored pencil for shading and background. I compared this new piece to an old project about the fear of radioactive materials, which was done on drawing board in black ink.

The first stanza of the poem sets an eerie tone where disaster has struck, but the world continues as though not much has happened. This is reflective of the secrecy of the Soviet Union in the three days following the disaster. Then, the second stanza reveals the consequences, and the third stanza emphasizes the irreversible nature of what has happened. The concluding stanza shows that while the mistakes of the government and humanity regarding nuclear safety have been exasperated, there is hope in nature's reclamation of the exclusion zone. Science may have faltered, but the people's culture and strength did not, and nature did not.

As for the artwork (fig. 1), I tried to visualize what I had learned. The flame represents the spark of life returning and overcoming the devil, or disaster. The devil melting can be interpreted as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Slavic people overcoming trauma. The organisms growing from the candle symbolize nature reclaiming the area. The flame and life exemplify the strength and survival instincts of the people, and their ability to preserve their culture. Then, the hands that are composed along the edges of the drawing create the image of looking through a window, using hands to block the light. This symbolically acknowledges my outside perspective and represents students like me who participate in this class to uncover the truth. Therefore, they must block out the biases and false information we have unconsciously adopted as if it were light through a window.

This project exposes how heavily the media we consume regarding nuclear catastrophes affects our perspective of it. That is to say, what I found most enlightening about this assignment was what I realized after I had finished it. I drew a picture a year ago which showed a much more stereotypical perspective on nuclear energy (fig. 2). It contributed to the fearful, negative emotions associated with events such as the Chernobyl disaster as it depicted many nuclear warning signs and a claustrophobic view of a person in a hazmat suit. However, my new artwork was founded on ideas of strength and perseverance. It proves the importance of gaining information from a variety of sources, especially from first-person accounts. This class positively changed my perspective, and I hope this project exemplifies the significance of that.

[1] Please, consult the bibliography for more information on these sources.

Found Poem:

An atomic black candle
Blisters hearts as they are beating
Watches tick in unopened doors
Blessed is each moment the devil is sleeping

These worldwide fields of death
Seemed about to speak, to confess
To the ghost of a rock in the broken sky of morning
To the world that has always been so accommodating

But shh... the sun has already discovered everything
Including what we have done.
Since the chestnuts vanished like soldiers
There's no shade to protect from her scorching heat

How bitter for us to know
The land that loves us and forgives everything
was abandoned by us forever
Animals have taken refuge in a human-less place



Figure 1. Artwork from December 2023.




Figure 2. Artwork from May 2023.

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**"The World is Watching: Global Reactions to the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster"**
*Kate Sandridge, University of Pittsburgh*

My project is a website featuring a timeline of events of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster in the hours, days, weeks, and months after. The timeline includes the timestamped responses from the Soviet government, shown alongside the reporting of various western media companies. Also shown are the few official media releases of the Soviet Union, as well as reactions to those releases from the West. I wanted to contextualize the way the disaster was reported, showing the reports alongside the timing of the recovery and response from the USSR. I also wanted to show just how little information was available to other countries and that this lack of information wasn't due to the Soviet Union not knowing anything, but a deliberate withholding of information. Before the first western media report, the government was already evacuating Pripyat, meaning they were fully aware of how dangerous the event was, they simply weren't releasing it. The format of my project is a website, broken down by time period (April 26th, April 27th-29th, April 30th- May 9th, and May 9th+) to make it easier to view. I have reports from the US, UK, Australia, Germany, Italy, and France, as well as reports from the USSR.

I think that the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster is one of the most understated disasters in human history, and it's often overlooked because it "only affected the USSR," but that's not the whole story. The disaster came at the tail end of the Cold War, when anti-Soviet sentiment was still high in the US. It exposed the fragility of the Soviet government system and was one of the largest factors leading to the collapse of the USSR only a few years later. Most of all, however, less than two decades after the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was a sobering reminder to the entire population of the globe of the catastrophic effects nuclear war could have on the world. The anti-nuclear sentiment that it generated can still be felt today. All of these points are mentioned, in some capacity, in my sources, and viewing these broadcasts can give a better idea of what each of these countries thought of the USSR and how this influenced their reactions. I think these are all important views to understand when considering the impacts of the Chernobyl disaster on the global scale. I hope that my project helped to capture these views and present them in a digestible and straightforward way.[1]

[1] More information on my sources can be found in the bibliography.

Website Link: https://sites.google.com/pitt.edu/the-world-is-watching/home

Screenshots from Website:




## Background

The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster was a catastrophic nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Pripyat, Ukraine, then part of the Soviet Union. It occurred on April 26, 1986 and resulted from a flawed reactor design and operator errors during a safety test. The reactor exploded, releasing a large amount of radioactive material into the atmosphere. It was the worst nuclear disaster in history, leading to immediate deaths, long-term health issues, and widespread contamination.

Chernobyl was hidden and covered up by the then USSR, so few people, citizens in Pripyat included, knew anything about the nature of the disaster. This






**Timeline events with corresponding media are bolded.**

*April 27, 1986, 10 a.m.*
Helicopters begin dumping sand, clay, boron, lead and dolomite into the burning core in an attempt to slow radioactive emissions.

*April 27, 1986: 2 p.m.*
Soviet officials begin evacuations of Pripyat after 36 hours.

*April 28, 1986: Early morning*
Swedish power plant, Forsmark, detects high radiation




The World is Watching: Worldl...
Home
April 25: Background
April 26: D-Day
April 27 - April 29
April 30 - May 9
May 14+
Sources
April 30 - May 9
April 30, 1986
US's ABC and Italy's TG1 both report on the disaster.
May 2, 1986
UK's ITV reports on Chernobyl
May 4, 1986
Liquid nitrogen is pumped underneath the dead reactor in order to cool it. The tearing down of contaminated villages, killing of contaminated pets, and burying of contaminated materials begins.
France's Soir 3 reports on the disaster.
Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, Original Re...
Watch later
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# SECTION 5

## POLITICAL (IN)STABILITY AND MIGRATION

**"Examining the Relationship Between Slovak Immigrants and Labor"**
*Alec Ott, University of North Carolina Wilmington (UNCW)*

The Slovak immigrants who settled in Pennsylvania in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were an essential component in the growth of industrialization in America. Escaping the economic hardship and forced assimilation imposed by the Austro-Hungarian empire, Slovaks sought prosperity in this new, growing economy. Although this group of Eastern Europeans was one of many that came to America seeking a better quality of life, their story becomes essential in the history of immigrant struggle during the industrial era.

Migration from the Austro-Hungarian empire was not commonplace in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as "the territories of Austria-Hungary, especially, were the most important regions of origin for seasonal workers who found employment all over Europe."[1] Mobility of various ethnic groups residing in the empire became a critical aspect of daily life as laborers could seek competitive wages outside of their homeland. The Slovaks also participated in this process but were denied the equal representation shared by other ethnicities. "The limited suffrage systems for Hungary's county congregations and parliament prevented Slovak…nationals from electing more than small numbers of representatives each at any one time."[2] Such actions served as motivation to seek opportunities outside of Europe and across the Atlantic in the United States, where the jobs were plentiful, and representation based on their specific ethnicity would not be denied.

By the early twentieth century, many Slovak immigrants settled in the United States' northeast corner. They had focused their settlement on the emerging industrial cities of the northeast and began to create their communities. One such area is Pennsylvania, specifically, the areas surrounding Pittsburgh, as it was a powerhouse of steel production and coal mining. Pittsburgh's industries made it a popular destination for European immigrants: "By the 1880s, sections of Pittsburgh's several industrialized zones had become settlement areas for the city's foreign-born."[3]

Slovak immigrants typically found jobs through established family or acquaintance connections made by those Slovaks who had arrived before them. "The tendency for Slovaks to follow family and friends to America was one factor that ultimately influenced Slovak settlement patterns in Pittsburgh."[4] Social and familial connections allowed immigrants to find employment, quickly establish themselves in their community, earn a wage, and send a portion back to their family still in the home country. By the late nineteenth century, Slovaks, arriving from Zemplin in eastern Slovakia, became the first to arrive and to form established connections with employment. In her article about Slovak immigration to the area, June Granatir Alexander provides the example of Slovak John Lesniansky, who, after gaining employment in the US, was instrumental in bringing in more Slovak workers to the region: "Lesniansky subsequently obtained jobs for his fellow countrymen, including those still in Hungary…The ability to secure jobs through a countryman helped spur the early migration of Zemplin Slovaks to Allegheny City."[5] Subsequently, as demand

[1] Annemarie Steidl, "Migration Patterns in the Late Habsburg Empire," in *Migration in Austria*, ed. Gunter Bischof and Dirk Rupnow (University of New Orleans Press, 2017), 26-76.
[2] Gary B. Cohen, "Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914," *Central European History* 40, no. 2 (2007): 249.
[3] June Granatir Alexander, "Staying Together: Chain Migration and Patterns of Slovak Settlement in Pittsburgh Prior to World War I," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 1, no. 1 (1981): 57.
[4] Ibid., 59.
[5] Ibid., 60-61.

for jobs and population size increased, large portions of the Pennsylvania Slovak population became employed in the steel and mining industry.

The Slovaks faced increased discrimination from English-speaking co-workers and the Pennsylvania legislature, following population and employment rate increases. In 1889, Pennsylvania passed a law limiting the Slavic influx: "It required future miners to pass an examination *in English* for state certification."[6] Passage of this law restricted their economic mobility inside of Pennsylvania and the requirement to prove competency in English directly attacked the Slovak community. For the first time outside of their home country, Slovaks were restricted in a particular capacity because of their ethnicity. Because of the formation of their community and the strength gained from it, the Slovaks could demonstrate that they were displeased with this situation.

The United Mine Workers of America was established in 1890 in Ohio and came to represent coal miners in several states in the northeastern region. In Pennsylvania, the union represented coal miners in Philadelphia and monopolized the surrounding mining areas. This union was hostile towards the Slovak population, as they were willing to work for meager wages, which directly competed with what the union aimed to achieve with its members: "…ignorant of the American tongue, numbering a host of separate nationalities, and working at the lowest wages, these groups, unionists believed, could hardly be organized to better their lot."[7] This sentiment drove the Slovak immigrants to resent the union and the activists that portrayed them as strike busters, which guaranteed their utility as a scapegoat ethnicity to be used to further the union and company goals.

Meanwhile, in 1897, the United Mine Workers of Lattimer, Pennsylvania, faced unpaid overtime, unsafe working conditions, and the requirement to purchase goods through the company store. This union was viewed highly by the Slovak immigrant and other ethnic populations as it "offered an alternative to the discriminatory American Federation of Labor unions which, from the 1890s on, systematically excluded the unskilled, immigrants, women, African-Americans and other minorities."[8] Strikes against powerful companies like the Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal Company became exceedingly dangerous at this time as the threat of hired armed militias often restored the production that was halted. "Sheriff James Martin of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, lost control over his posse of 86 deputies."[9] In September, nineteen unarmed strikers were killed, and another thirty-eight were wounded. The justification for violence by the sheriff deputies highlights tensions between the laborers and those financed to maintain the status quo of the existing labor.

The American-Slovakian newspaper, *Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny*, was circulated to create a sense of community among the Slovaks in America and reported on this massacre to highlight the tragedy. An eyewitness to the event in Lattimer reported, "Bullets flew over my head as bleeding strikers jumped over me. Anyone who still had the strength ran for his life because the deputies were shooting them in their backs."[10] The slaughtering of Slovak and other ethnic minorities by law enforcement sent shockwaves through the community. Such incidents illustrated

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[6] Victor R. Greene, "A Study in Slavs, Strikes, and Unions: The Anthracite Strike of 1897," *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 31, no. 2 (1964): 201.
[7] Ibid., 199-201
[8] Mildred Allen Beik, "The Significance of the Lattimer Massacre: Who Owns Its History?" *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 69, no. 1 (2002): 67.
[9] M. Mark Stolarik, "A Slovak Perspective on the Lattimer Massacre," *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 69, no. 1 (2002): 33.
[10] Ibid.

dangerous conditions that laborers were willing to face to demonstrate their frustration with their employers. This single event changed how Slovak immigrants would view labor, revealing to them the complex dimensions of the inequality and unfair treatment of labor in America.

With this came a change in mentality in the Slovak ethnic group as well as labor from nativists and other American laborers. The significance of the event consisted in its role in "inspiring a coalition between new immigrants and native-born working-class laborers."[11] Protests increased the risk of fatalities within the community as the collective mindset changed. Slovaks in America now understood how they are viewed by their employer: inexpensive, reliable, and exploitable. With this came the previously absent support of the English-speaking laborer: "The English-speaking rank and file were stimulated to action by witnessing the proven determination and sacrifice of the new immigrants."[12] Tragedy inadvertently brought two opposed social and ethnic groups together which allowed for the united effort of betterment in their working condition. Combined with social outcry from across the country and even from the Austro-Hungarian government, this led to an increase in the membership of the United Mine Workers, whose local chapter gained 15,000 new members.[13]

Moving forward, the Slovak immigrants gained an immense feeling of approval for labor unions. With the tragedy and violence of the strikes behind them, Slovaks experienced a stronger feeling of community with other ethnicities and the native American laborers. They continued to participate in these unions until the 1950s when the arrival of the McCarthy administration brough misunderstanding of the purpose and goals of labor unionism, and the fear of a communist infiltration rose. Although the opinion of unions became negative and was seen as un-American under the McCarthy administration (the fight against un-Americanism was essentially a "direct attack on labor unions…"[14]), the number of active members remained positive despite the misinformation.

Following the first generation of immigrants in 1873, integration became more apparent, and communal ideas of what it meant to be American changed. Since Slovakia fell to the Iron Curtain their disdain for the Communist party's rule of their homeland grew, thus proving their loyalty to their American home. Many previously aligned with the Democratic Party. However, because of their weak response to the rising popularity of communism, Slovaks began aligning themselves with the Republicans, who had "taken on the mantle of anticommunism."[15] The Republican party's favorable response to the communist takeover of the Slovak homeland led to the growth of pro-Americanism within the community and active participation in government.

Joe McCarthy, a Republican Senator from the state of Wisconsin, is infamous for stirring fears of communism among American citizens: "… despite the tenuous nature of the Cold War, American policymakers portrayed it in the most apocalyptic of terms."[16] This fear trickled down to Slovak immigrants who had just witnessed their home country become engulfed in the waves of an aggressive outside country imposing its social and economic system upon its subjects. Although the Slovak immigrants at this time had lived in America long enough to feel immense

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[11] Michael P. Roller, "Rewriting Narratives of Labor Violence: A Transnational Perspective of the Lattimer Massacre," *Historical Archaeology* 47, no.3 (2013): 109.
[12] Ibid., 114.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ieva Zake, "Anticommunist White Ethnics in Search of True Americanness: Ideas and Alliances in the 1950s-1970s," *Journal of American Studies* 47, no. 4 (2013): 1068.
[15] Ibid., 1074.
[16] Ellen Schrecker, "McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism," *Social Research* 71, no. 4 (2004): 1048.

patriotism, that did little to deter fellow Slovaks from pushing rhetoric in support of the Slovak regime governing their homeland during WWII, as well as anti-capitalism messages attempting to blame the American economic system for the war. "Slovakia's Monsignor Jozef Tiso…solidified anti-Communism and piety tenets of post-war Americanism for those of Eastern European descent."[17] The Slovaks were quick to dispel communist sympathies in their American communities, leading to a separation from those who remained in their homeland and favored communist rule.

With the Slovaks now convinced that the Republican party stands firmly in support of them against communism in their home country, the propaganda targeting Slovaks from inside the Eastern Bloc failed in its attempt to convince the American Slovaks of their cause. Going forward, communism fell out of favor within the Slovak community as they continued their lives inside America. With this came a negative opinion of labor unions because of the push that labor unions had become communist, which soon became a relic of their early labor years.

Examining Slovak immigration into Pennsylvania in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is vital for the understanding of the relationship between Slovaks and labor. Although Slovak immigrants had struggled for representation and treatment equal to that of others, they had earned their rights through suffering under unregulated industries. The Slovak immigrants have fully assimilated into American society, but their contribution when they first arrived cannot be understated in the history of American labor and immigration.

[17] Robert M. Zecker, "'Not Communists Exactly, but Sort of Like Non-Believers': The Hidden Radical Transcript of Slovak Immigrants in Philadelphia, 1890-1954," *The Oral History Review* 29, no. 1 (2002): 32.

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**"Crusades as a Movement in the Pursuit of Power"**

*Yijin Qu, University of Rochester*

## Introduction

During the European Middle Ages, a series of military expeditions known as the Crusades resulted in conflicts between Christians and non-Christian groups. In the series of Crusade movements, people from different social groups were mobilized and actively participated in the expeditions to the "holy land" against "pagans." With the Crusading movement, the Christian order in Europe gradually reaches its peak in terms of power and social control. In this case, understanding the Crusades becomes very essential for understanding the expansion of the Christian order during the European Middle Ages. In my paper, I argue that the Crusades can be understood as a movement with the primary incentive to pursue power.

In my paper, I argue that the personal gain of power could be perceived differently by different groups of people. First, the Popes utilized the Crusades as a means to increase their power in Christendom. The power of Popes saw significant growth with the Papacy Reform and the Crusades. Second, secular lords could benefit from the Crusades in various ways. By leading the Crusader armies, the lords could either win reputations that enabled them to expand their power in their homeland or had an opportunity to be entitled as Crusader kings. Meanwhile, by supporting the Crusades without taking the cross, the lords also could either remove their enemies or have a chance to consolidate or centralize power domestically.

## Literature Review

As a result of studying the possible causes of the Crusades, scholars have listed various factors that can provide socio-political or ideological explanations. Most intuitive interpretations accredited the waves of the Crusades to widespread Christian fanaticism. But more recently, scholars have begun to describe social-political motivations for the Crusades as well. Among them, Tyerman posits the "diversity of 'many expansions'" of multiple political actors during Crusades.[1] In 2016, Lisa Blaydes and Christopher Paik discussed the political implication of the Crusading movement as a state-building practice. Using the original data set, they found that the states with more Crusader elites experienced more advanced political institutionalization and stability.[2] However, most of the scholarly work only treated the political implications as an outcome of the Crusades rather than a motivation of multiple political actors to take the cross. While the main focus of the prior research is largely restricted to the considerations of state-building and expansion of political power by secular kings, I argue that the Crusades can be understood as a result of collective actions by various political actors who had their own rationales in the pursuit of political power when organizing the Crusades or participating in them.

## Papacy: The Acquisition of Power

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, due to the lack of imperial central power in Western Europe, Christian bishops who remained in the local churches gained power in local governance. At that time, local aristocracies representing secular powers exercised huge influence

[1] Christopher Tyerman, "Expansion and the Crusades," in *A Companion to the Medieval World*, edited by Carol Lansing and Edward D. English (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009).

[2] Lisa Blaydes and Christopher Paik, "The impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe," *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016): 553.

on appointing Popes which resulted in the decline of the Papal power during 900-1050. Under these conditions, the Papal Reform, proposed by Pope Gregory VII and furthered by other Popes, declared the supremacy of the Papal power and its independence from secular power. I argue that initiating the Crusades was an essential step for the Popes to expand their power and to ensure the continued process of the Papal Reform.

According to Tyerman, the primary goal of the Papal Reform was "towards restoring to the church the pristine autonomy and spirituality of the Acts of Apostles."[3] In this case, the Papal Reform needed to include regulations regarding the clergy and their independence in the exercise of power. And these goals turned into a series of assertions made by Pope Gregory VII. According to the *Dictatus Papae* issued by Pope Gregory VII, the dictates that the "Roman pontiff alone can with right to be called universal" and "he alone can depose or reinstate bishops" clearly asserted the independence of the Papal power and its right to appoint regional bishops.[4] Meanwhile, Pope Gregory VII also declared that it may be permitted to him to "depose emperors" which announced the supremacy of the Papal power over secular kings.[5] However, this assertion deviated from the "mutual-cooperation" relationship between the church and the state and produced a series of conflicts with the emperors who were armed with knights and soldiers. An example of the conflict was the excommunication of Henry IV, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

According to the *Letter to Gregory VII* in 1076, Henry IV accused Gregory VII of being a "false monk" who "achieved money; by money, favor; by the sword, the throne of peace."[6] Though in 1077, the emperor Henry IV experienced the Humiliation of Canossa after his vassals abandoned him, he successfully kicked Pope Gregory VII out of Rome and appointed an anti-Pope in 1084. In 1086, the Pope finally returned to Rome with the help of the Normans, but the conflict continued until 1105 when Henry IV was overthrown by his son.

In this case, we can see that in the process of the first stage of the Papal Reform, some secular emperors with armed knights and soldiers were reluctant to submit to the Papal power, and the reform "invited opposition, much of it physical" as described by Tyerman.[7] In response to the opposition, the Popes had an incentive to find ways to eliminate the armed oppositions they faced. Given that the mass belief in Christianity had already been established in Europe, fighting a "holy war" was one of the rational choices for the Popes, as long as it was accompanied by a deliberate "legitimization" of their power by means of the religious discourse.

As early as 1074, Pope Gregory VII intended to initiate a Crusade expedition to Constantinople after the defeat of the Byzantine army in the battle of Manzikert. It was generally a failed movement that could not mobilize many participants. However, according to Tyerman, the "objects," the "demonstrations," and "rhetoric" all "pointed to the path his protégé Urban II chose."[8] The rhetoric in Urban II's addresses can illuminate the true incentive of the Popes to initiate Crusades: removing active knights from Christendom and uniting Christendom with the "Peace and Truce of God."

For Pope Urban II's address at Clermont, various sources provide different versions of his speech. There were three reasons for the Crusades that the Pope provided as evidenced by the

[3] Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (Harvard University Press, 2009), 45.
[4] "Medieval Sourcebook: Gregory VII: Dictatus Papae 1090," Fordham University, accessed September 16, 2024, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/g7-dictpap.asp.
[5] Ibid.
[6] "Medieval Sourcebook: Henry IV: Letter to Gregory VII, Jan 24 1076," Fordham University, accessed September 16, 2024, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/henry4-to-g7a.asp.
[7] Tyerman, *God's War*, 46.
[8] Ibid., 49.

majority of the sources: to protect the churches in the East, to recapture Jerusalem, and for personal salvation. However, those reasons were highly likely stated by the Pope as a mere political discourse appealing to the participants of the council. In this case, were there other reasons provided by Pope Urban II that illuminated his true motives?

According to Robert of Reims, in his address at Clermont, Pope Urban II pronounced, "Let your quarrels end, let the war cease...Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre."[9] Here, the Pope calls for a redirection of internal violence onto the common external enemy; the same logic is also discernable in the accounts by Baldric of Dol and Guibert of Nogent. As documented by Baldric of Dol, Pope Urban II also claimed that the knights were "oppressors," "plunderers," "robbers" and "guilty of homicide," which was all against "the way which leads to life" by God.[10] Guibert of Nogent confirmed Baldric's account. Here we can see one of the more subtle reasons for the Crusades. Urban II's letters, written after the council, alluded to this reason even more explicitly. As Pope Urban II's speech at Clermont successfully mobilized mass fanaticism to take the cross, in the letters, the Pope further clarified who was appropriate to go on Crusades. In the letter to his supporters in Bologna, Urban II instructs that "neither clerics nor monks" should go "without the permission of their Bishops or abbots."[11] This is another piece of evidence to show that the true motive of the Pope for initiating Crusades was to gain power by removing the opposing armed knights, because he obviously tried to prevent the removal of clerics and monks who served for his Christian order. And Pope Urban even explicitly stated that "we were stimulating the minds of Knights to go" in his letter to the monks at the Congregation of Vallombrosa.[12]

As for the results of the Crusades, the Popes fulfilled their initial goals as the Papal Reform furthered. After initiating the first crusade, the Popes were able to propose and implement the second stage of the Papal Reform. The Popes were able to lay investiture of bishops and to end the conflict with the German Emperor, securing the independence of the churches. Meanwhile, the Popes were also able to institutionalize their religious bureaucracy and developed strong and centralized institutions.

The expansion of the Papal power was also shown through the organization and mobilization of the later Crusades, in which the institutionalization of the church occurred. When Pope Urban II tried to mobilize the First Crusade in 1095, it was Urban II himself who directly addressed the mass gathering at the Council of Clermont. We may infer here that there was a lack of effective intermediate institutions that could accomplish the mobilization without the direct contact of the Pope with the warriors. However, the methods of mobilization changed with the institutionalization of the churches.

After Pope Eugene III announced the Second Crusade in 1145, an important figure emerged in the mobilization process: Bernard of Clairvaux. Bernard was an abbot in the Cistercian Order in Western Europe. Following Pope Eugene III, he commissioned a preaching tour across churches in different areas to mobilize people to participate in the Crusade. It was important to notice that when Bernard asked for the "full papal authorization and legatine power" for conducting the preach tours, the Pope "provided him with the necessary means to discipline and direct recruiting operations."[13] Meanwhile, according to Tyerman, the "network of Cistercian

[9] Edward Peters, ed., *The First Crusade: "The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres" and Other Source Materials* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 28.
[10] Ibid., 31.
[11] Ibid., 44.
[12] Ibid., 45.
[13] Tyerman, *God's War*, 278.

order which helped propel Bernard to international prominence in the first place proved central."[14] Furthermore, when it was the time for the Third Crusade, the Pope was able to send Papal legates to local churches and empowered them with the Papal power to conduct preaches in assigned areas with the assistance of local clerics. According to Tyerman, "the main preaching agents were actively engaged in the wider organization of the enterprise."[15] By doing so, the Pope could better oversee the process of organizing the Crusade. At the time of the Fourth Crusade, Pope Innocent was even able to "impose a three-year tax of a twentieth on the church to be collected by centrally appointed papal officials," which indicated the degree of centralization of Papal power on local churches and the institutionalization of the churches.[16]

Though the institutionalization of the churches and the centralization of the Papal power may not have been the Popes' original motivation for the Crusades, the removal of armed knights contributed to the progress of the Papal Reform, which paved the way for the centralization of the Papal power. Meanwhile, this (potentially) unintentional effect brought by the Crusades also contributed to the growth of the Papal power. Since the First Crusade, the local ecclesiastical institutions deeply participated in the financing of the warriors who took the cross. The local ecclesiastical institutions provided loans or mortgages to the warriors who needed funds, which was an important way for the monks and nuns to participate in the movement. By increasing the interactions and economic exchange, the increased attachment and affinity to the churches could be reinforced, thus "creating" new power to be acquired by the ecclesiastical institutions. Seeing this effect, the Popes were also possibly motivated to stage more Crusades.

**Secular Lords: The Opportunism**

Another phenomenon that accompanied the Crusades was the cooperation of secular lords who responded to the call of the Pope. Without them, the Crusades would have never happened. During the later Crusades, the secular power played an important role. As Tyerman puts it, "secular governmental power in each kingdom (during the recruitment of the Third Crusade) reinforced or subsumed the ecclesiastical mechanisms of recruitment."[17] In the current section, I argue that different mechanisms of opportunism motivated the secular lords and kings to actively participate in the Crusades.

The first mechanism pertained to expanding power by participating in the Crusades in the Holy Land. This type of opportunism was widespread among the lords and kings. One motivation of this type was to build their empire in the Holy Land. As early as the First Crusade, there were lords and other leaders entirely or partially motivated by this dream. Bohemund I of Antioch is a great example of this type of leaders. Only by explaining his motive for seeking to build his empire could we explain his strategic choices and decisions in Constantinople and the Holy Land. First, Bohemund would have encountered difficulties trying to build his empire in his place of origin. It is known that Bohemund was not born into a noble family; he also lacked money to support a large army.[18] We know from historical sources that Bohemund was generally described as "overbearing" and "dangerous."[19] In 1096, while most other crusaders "were at least of comital status, Bohemund was technically still a vassal of a count."[20] Meanwhile, according to Tyerman, Bohemund even

[14] Ibid., 281.
[15] Ibid., 383.
[16] Ibid., 482.
[17] Ibid., 393.
[18] Peters, *The First Crusade*, 147.
[19] Ibid., 153.
[20] Tyerman, *God's War*, 112.

failed to inherit his father's title after the failure of the Norman Invasion of 1081-1085.[21] Due to his non-noble origins, Bohemund lacked resources that would allow him to build his empire in Western Europe. Instead, he tried to seek territorial gains in the East. Prior to the Crusade, he fought against the Byzantine Empire and tried to build his own territories there. According to Byzantine princess Anna Komnene, her father, Emperor Alexios, was aware of Bohemund's "hidden and deceitful dealings" in Durazzo and Larissa, and Bohemund himself admitted that he was the enemy of Alexios.[22] Thus, I argue that Bohemund repeatedly turned to the East motivated to build his own empire there.

Assuming his motive was to build his empire in the East, I can deliberately explain his strategies in the Crusade. Obviously, Bohemund had practical motives to participate in the movement. According to Tyerman, the army he gathered was small and lacked "the power of lordship or the purse."[23] As a great commander with the experience fighting against Byzantium, he knew that his own forces could never seize Constantinople. Meanwhile, the mutually beneficial agreement proposed by Alexios served Bohemund's best interests and made him change his attitude towards the Emperor. The sources describe the beneficial terms promised by Alexios to Bohemund: "… if he willingly took the oath to him, he [the Emperor] would give him, in return, land in extent from Antioch fifteen days journey, and eight in width."[24] Peter Tudebode, who wrote about this occurrence later and used additional sources, recorded the same terms: "…after Bohemund took the oath, the Emperor Alexios promised to give him lands equivalent to fifteen days journey in length and eight such days in width from Antioch."[25] So, as a result of the agreement, Bohemund received what he wanted by simply taking the oath. Only by assuming that his motives consisted of acquiring new lands in the East can we explain his active role in pressing other crusaders (especially Godfrey) to take the oath and not to initiate conflicts with Alexios.

Finally, the popular argument that Bohemund was driven in the Crusade by his Christian faith does not stand the test of reality. While it is generally true that the leaders of the Crusades were attached to Christianity, there were clearly other motives in the picture. For Bohemund, the argument of Christian faith cannot explain why he refused to follow the main army to Jerusalem and stayed at Antioch instead. After the Crusaders seized Antioch, Bohemund finally found a chance to gain his own territory. If Bohemund had been mainly driven by personal piety, he would have led his army to Jerusalem because Jerusalem was the goal of the Crusade. I argue that Bohemund's main motive was opportunistic – he tried to establish his domain in the East.

In later periods, many lords in Western Europe came to the Holy Land and governed or co-governed the Crusader States, without organizing Crusades proper. For example, according to William of Tyre, Fulk, the count of Anjou, was invited to the Kingdom of Jerusalem and given marriage to Melisende.[26] After the death of King Baldwin III, Melisende and Fulk of Anjou co-governed the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and this was the main purpose of Fulk's arrival to the Holy Land. Another motivation of this type was the desire to gain a reputation. After their return from the First Crusade, the crusaders were portrayed as legends and heroes. Massive legendary literature was created, and oral legends were circulated throughout Western Europe. The *Chanson d'Antioch* which accounted for the process of the First Crusade was one of the most renowned epics among

[21] Ibid.
[22] Peters, *The First Crusade,* 174.
[23] Tyerman, *God's War*, 112.
[24] Peters, *The First Crusade,* 173.
[25] Ibid.
[26] William Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea, Vol.2* (Columbia University Press, 1943), 38.

them. With those legends, the leaders of the First Crusades became renowned within Christendom. Inspired by this, some kings and lords were motivated to take the cross. For example, in the Second Crusade, French King Louis VII was trapped by the "tutelage of his father's cronies" and needed to "redeem his early mistakes as a king."[27] Hence, the Second Crusade offered him a unique opportunity to build his own reputation. Meanwhile, according to the veterans of the Second Crusade, King Louis VII indeed "harboured a 'secret' desire to go to Jerusalem."[28] In terms of the outcome, after his return from the Second Crusade, Louis became a "stronger monarch" that "had better control over the vassals."

The second mechanism related to the growth of the monarchic power through the organization of the Crusades. This type of opportunism usually applied to secular kings. By supporting the Crusades, certain secular kings were able to expand their control over the empire by collaborating with churches and preparing the Crusades. The Holy Expedition gave the monarchs a reasonable excuse to integrate the state power in general. For example, before the Second Crusade, the French state was "geographically limited" and "highly dependent on the church."[29] The Second Crusade gave Louis VII a great opportunity to consolidate state power. As Tyerman puts it, Louis not only "established lasting relationships with magnates" that later contributed to the centralization of his power, but also "negotiated with churches" over the tax levied for the Crusades throughout the campaign.[30] For the first time, the king could "demonstrate his royal authority" in front of local lords during the Council of Vézelay, gathered specifically for preaching the Second Crusade.[31] Along with this demonstration of political authority, Louis VII was able to conduct the census and levy a universal tithe to raise funds for the Crusades. As argued by Lee and Zhang, since the census played a crucial role in "controlling opportunistic behavior in collective settings," it indicated the state's capacity to "facilitate cooperative outcomes" of the sub-state actors.[32] Thus, these programs in French politics attributed to the organization of the Second Crusade also paved the way for his return as a strong monarch in Western Europe. Later Crusades reinforced these institutional approaches of the state in an expanding manner. In the organization of the Third Crusade, both the English and French monarchs decided to levy the 10% "Saladin Tithe," though French King Philip II faced difficulties to progress. Likewise, the Baltic Crusades which were more systemic and organized mostly by the German state, can be seen as the prelude to the German territorial expansion in the twelfth century.[33] With these institutional approaches of the state, the monarchical power of the state was expanding alongside the Crusading waves. By the end of the Third Crusade, the states' control over local lords was greatly enhanced compared to the pre-crusade period, and France even emerged as a strong state in Western Europe.

## Conclusion

In every term, the Crusades are extremely significant for understanding the European Middle Ages. In this regard, it is helpful to examine their causes, as well as crusaders' motivations. In this paper, I argue that a crucial motivation for the Crusades was the pursuit of power. By initiating the Crusades, the Pope could successfully remove the armed knights who were the major

[27] Tyerman, *God's War*, 275.
[28] Ibid., 276.
[29] Ibid., 275.
[30] Ibid., 276.
[31] Ibid., 280.
[32] Melissa M. Lee and Nan Zhang, "Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity," *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 1 (2017): 119-120.
[33] Tyerman, *God's War*, 681.

enemies of the Papal Reform. And the Pope could also develop religious institutions to centralize his power over local institutions through the process of organizing Crusades. Lords and kings supported the Pope, because they were opportunistic about the expansion of power. The lords saw the pursuit of the Holy Land as a new avenue for building their own empires and the kings saw the Crusades either as a means to gain reputation or as an opportunity to expand their power through the organizational process. These two motivations were very significant in initiating the Crusades.

However, I am not arguing that the pursuit of power was the only crucial motivation. Crusading as an effective means for power expansion could not have succeeded without the precondition that Christian piety prevailed throughout Christendom at the bottom level. Without the mass appeal of the Papal call, Crusading would have lacked its popular base. But this does not mean that religious piety was more important for the Crusades than the pursuit of power. Most of the time, the leaders like Popes, kings, and lords propagandized and organized the Crusades (except for a few people's crusades), and religious piety fails to explain the strategic choices made by the leaders in the Holy Land, and during the bizarre decisions to storm the Christian cities of Zara and Constantinople. Meanwhile, religious piety also fails to explain the political progress and the power consolidation that occurred during the Crusading period. Should we really attribute those to unintentional outcomes of the Crusades? Thus, these two perspectives also made me argue that the crucial motivation for the Crusades was the pursuit of power.

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# SECTION 6

# VOLATILE NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

**"The Impacts of Linguistic Variance on Higher Education Experiences in Kyrgyzstan"**

*Lily Nemirovsky, Mount Holyoke College*

## Introduction

Unlike most former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan continues to use Russian as an official language alongside its national language, Kyrgyz. Currently, the linguistic landscape in Kyrgyzstan is remarkably patchy, with Kyrgyz tending to be the primary language used in villages and the southern part of the country, while Russian is more widely spoken in the capital city, Bishkek. In 2021, 65.3% of primary and secondary school students in Kyrgyzstan attended schools with only one language of instruction.[1] In this paper, I refer to the linguistic discrepancy between geographic areas, ethnic groups, and interpersonal relations as "linguistic variance." Linguistic variance poses a unique challenge within the higher education scene, where students from all over the country come together and face learning materials, classmates and teachers who operate on varying linguistic bases. During their time in university, students' linguistic backgrounds determine their ability to comprehend class material and form bonds with professors and classmates. My research indicates that linguistic variance serves as an obstacle for students from rural backgrounds at a greater rate than for students from Bishkek.

## Methodology

Information in this paper was mainly gathered from online sources such as journal articles, official government and NGO data, and academic papers. In addition, I created and distributed an original survey about experiences relating to linguistic variance, which was answered by 237 students and 75 professors across 11 universities in Bishkek. Conclusions are based on both previously existing knowledge and the author's original survey results.

## Background

1. Pre-Soviet Era

Russian influence on the Kyrgyz education system began in earnest during the 19th century. Before conquest by the Russian Empire, a well-developed network of Islamic schools and *madrasas* existed throughout Central Asia, but education was not accessible to most of the population. During the 1860s, Russian authorities implemented the "Il'minskii system." Under this system, Central Asians were educated in their own native languages in primary school and the Arabic alphabet was replaced by Cyrillic with the aim of cutting off access to religious texts written in Arabic.[2]

2. Soviet Era

Like most sectors in the Kyrgyz SSR, the higher education system was controlled by the centralized Soviet government for much of the 20th century. The Communist Party invested heavily in education and built schools throughout the country, which led to an increase in the

[1] "Distribution of the Number of Students in Daytime General Education Organizations by Language of Instruction," National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, accessed September 16, 2024, https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stat.kg%2Fru%2Fstatistics%2Fdownload%2Fdynamic%2F1220%2F&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK.

[2] Oxana Zemtsova, "Russification and Educational Policies in the Middle Volga region (1860-1914)" (PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2014), 86.

population's literacy by 83.3% in 53 years.[3] However, education was not geared towards the Kyrgyz people, but rather towards Russian immigrants, as entrance exams and instruction in higher education institutions (HEIs) were largely conducted in Russian. In 1938, Russian became the mandatory language of instruction in all schools, although this was not fully enforced.[4] Kyrgyz-language schools remained, but many parents chose to send their children to Russian-language schools because they were associated with greater chances of professional success.[5] While the suppression of national identity was somewhat alleviated during the Khruschev Thaw in the middle of the century, little effort was made to incorporate the native Kyrgyz population—or their culture—into the education system. In 1966, only 39% of students at HEIs in Kyrgyzstan were of Kyrgyz nationality.[6] By the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the desire to promote their ethnic identity and language was already simmering among the Kyrgyz people.[7]

3. Post-Independence

After independence, Kyrgyzstan's development was limited by its lack of lucrative natural resources such as gas or oil, dependency on foreign aid, and a corrupt government.[8] Expenditures on education declined from 8.2% to 3.5% of GDP in just five years (as of 2018, it had risen slightly to 5.5%).[9] Kyrgyz became a mandatory subject in all schools from first through eleventh grade, but the government did not provide adequate resources to fully realize the change and even today many schools fail to teach Kyrgyz sufficiently.[10] Schools, especially in rural areas, suffered from an acute lack of Kyrgyz-language textbooks, and for many years they continued to use old Russian-language Soviet books.[11] International organizations have funded the publication and distribution of some Kyrgyz-language textbooks, but they remain widely unaffordable for lower-income students.[12]

Teacher and professor salaries became uncompetitive within the new liberal economic market and many teachers of English and Russian left for Kazakhstan and Russia, creating a

[3] Duishon Shamatov et al., "Language and Education Quality in Kyrgyzstan: Demographic and Geographic Analysis of National Scholarship Test Results," in *Handbook of the Changing World Language Map,* ed. Stanley D. Brunn and Roland Kehrein (Springer, 2019), 3564, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02438-3_188.
[4] Mark S. Johnson, "The Legacy of Russian and Soviet Education and the Shaping of Ethnic, Religious, and National Identities in Central Asia," in *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, ed. Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 30.
[5] Britta Korth, "Education and Linguistic Division in Kyrgyzstan," in *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, ed. Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 98.
[6] Bohdan Krawchenko et al., "Universities and Society in Kyrgyzstan: A Historical, Political and Economic Perspective," in *Socially Responsible Higher Education: International Perspectives on Knowledge Democracy*, ed. Budd Hall and Rajesh Tandon (Brill, 2021), 140, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbn5.18.
[7] Johnson, "The Legacy of Russian and Soviet Education," 32.
[8] Gregory Gleason, "Ancient Societies and the New Millenium," in *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, ed. Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 15.
[9] Todd Drummond and Alan J. De Young, "Perspectives and Problems in Education Reform in Kyrgyzstan," in *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, ed. Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 205.
[10] Korth, "Education and Linguistic Division in Kyrgyzstan," 91.
[11] Ibid., 104.
[12] Michael Mertaugh, "Education in Central Asia, with Particular Reference to the Kyrgyz Republic," in *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, ed. Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 176.

shortage.[13] A student at Bishkek National University who is most comfortable speaking Russian testified, "[My] teacher sometimes tries to teach [English grammar] in Russian – but he cannot [help us] because he does not know Russian. He [appears] to know Kyrgyz well, but we do not know Kyrgyz."[14] This is just one example of how linguistic variance between students and teachers creates a multitude of learning obstacles.

Additionally, in 1992 HEIs began charging tuition, whereas during the USSR students could attend university free of charge.[15] This created two categories of students, the roughly 15% who receive a full scholarship ("budget" students / на бюджетной основе) and the rest, who pay fees ("contract" students / на контрактной основе).

**Findings and Conclusions**

1. General Results of the Author's Survey

Of the 237 total students who answered the author's survey, 81 were from Bishkek, 78 were from a village in Kyrgyzstan, 60 were from a city in Kyrgyzstan other than Bishkek, and 18 were international students (fig. 1). 93 felt equally comfortable speaking in Russian and Kyrgyz, 87 were most comfortable in Kyrgyz, 41 in Russian, 15 in English and 1 in another (unspecified) language (fig. 2).





Figure 1.

[13] Alan J. De Young and Charlene Santos, "Education in Central Asia During the Transition to a Market Economy," in *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, ed. Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 77.
[14] Alan J. DeYoung, *Lost in Transition: Redefining Students and Universities in the Contemporary Kyrgyz Republic* (Information Age Publishing, 2011), 112.
[15] Shamatov, "Language and Education Quality in Kyrgyzstan," 3566.





Figure 2.

A remarkable 60% had to improve their language skills in at least one language in order to prepare for university, a sizable task which puts many—especially rural students—at a disadvantage (fig. 3). 30% reported that not everyone in their class group feels comfortable speaking the same language (fig. 4). This has social implications, as students naturally have an easier time forming relationships with those they can effortlessly communicate with. Those that are in the linguistic minority may have trouble making friends, adding yet another incentive to skip class in a system that already disincentivizes attendance in many ways (see the section on state-run universities below).[16]




Figure 3.

[16] DeYoung, *Lost in Transition: Redefining Students and Universities in the Contemporary Kyrgyz Republic*, 64.




Figure 4.

Perhaps most concerning, 26% of students struggle to understand their teacher and / or complete classwork due to inadequate knowledge of the Language of Instruction (LoI) (fig. 5). This begs the question as to what portion of degrees awarded to graduates actually reflect substantial acquisition of knowledge, especially since graduation is essentially guaranteed due to widespread bribery and universities' dependence on revenue from tuition fees.[17]




Figure 5.

2. Foreign Funded Universities

In the decades following independence, the Kyrgyz government welcomed the establishment of dozens of foreign-funded universities. Turkey (International Ataturk Alatoo University, Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University), Russia (Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University),

[17] Aigul Kantoro kyzy, "Does the Large Number of Universities in Kyrgyzstan Reflect the Quality of Higher Education?" CABAR, July 10, 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/is-the-large-number-of-universities-in-kyrgyzstan-reflect-the-quality-of-higher-education.

America (the American University of Central Asia), Kuwait (International Kuwait University), England (Cavendish College London Bishkek) and Uzbekistan (Kyrgyz-Uzbek University) are a handful of the many foreign governments which have established their own HEIs in Kyrgyzstan over the last three decades. While these universities often provide a higher quality of education than public schools and open great opportunities for their graduates, they pose their own set of challenges. They are generally more expensive than public HEIs, although some, such as Kyrgyz-Turkic Manas University do offer merit- and need-based scholarships.

Such a diverse array of founder-countries complicates the already multilingual landscape at HEIs. Languages of Instruction (LoIs) include Russian, Kyrgyz, English, Arabic and Turkish. This severely disadvantages those who did not have access to foreign language courses in primary and secondary school, disproportionately students from rural areas.[18] The author's survey found that students from places in Kyrgyzstan other than Bishkek were more likely to have had to improve in one or more languages (64%) than students from Bishkek did (52%). Unfortunately, the results further reveal that many students are unable to improve enough to eliminate language inadequacy as an obstacle during their higher education experience. 21% of students from Bishkek, 25% of students from cities in Kyrgyzstan other than Bishkek, and 29% of students from villages in Kyrgyzstan maintained that they struggle in class due to deficient proficiency in the LoI. This is especially pressing given the fact that the majority of Kyrgyzstan's population lives in rural areas.[19]

Additionally, linguistic variance may inhibit Kyrgyzstan from attracting more international students, who usually pay higher tuition rates than local students and therefore have the potential to increase financial investment in the higher education scene. Between students from Bishkek, students from places in Kyrgyzstan other than Bishkek, and international students, the latter answered "yes" to the question about whether they struggled in class due to a weakness in the LoI at the highest rate. While universities should not cater their LoI choice to the needs of international students at the expense of locals, ensuring that there is substantial support for all students who struggle due to linguistic variance would assist Kyrgyzstan in becoming a more popular educational destination for students from all over the world.

3. State-Run Universities

Considering the financial and academic roadblocks presented by foreign funded universities, it is no surprise that 86% of students in Kyrgyzstan attend state-run universities,[20] despite the fact that they comprise only 55% of total HEIs (40 out of 73 HEIs in 2021).[21] State-run universities suffer from many of the same problems as public primary and secondary schools, such as tight budgets and teacher shortages. Students are placed into classes based on their year of matriculation without consideration for their previous language exposure. As a result, students in an English language class who have never studied it before may be grouped with and given the same learning material as students who have already studied it for years. The frustration this causes among students is reflected in their satisfaction levels; survey results suggest that only between

[18] Kathyrn H. Anderson et al., "Education in Central Asia During the Transition to a Market Economy," in *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, ed. Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young (Information Age Publishing, 2004), 140.
[19] "Explore All Countries – Kyrgyzstan," Central Intelligence Agency, last updated September 9, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/kyrgyzstan/.
[20] Krawchenko, "Universities and Society in Kyrgyzstan," 142.
[21] Seyil Najimudinova et al., "What Defines the University Choice? The Case of Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan," *Sosyoekonomi* 30, no. 54 (2022): 54, https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2022.04.03.

4% and 10% of students at state universities in Bishkek are fully satisfied with their education there.[22]

Acceptance to public universities is determined by students' scores on the National Scholarship Test (NST), a merit-based exam which was created as a response to the rampant nepotism prevalent within universities upon independence.[23] The top NST scorers receive a full scholarship to attend the university of their choice ("budget" students / на бюджетной основе), while those who do not score enough points must pay tuition ("contract" students / на контрактной основе). Quotas were introduced in 2003 to ensure proportional representation of "budget" students from different regions, categorized by Bishkek schools, oblast (provincial) center and town schools, village schools, and mountain schools.[24] The exam is available in Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek. One study found that 67% of students awarded grants were from village and mountain regions in 2017.[25] While this is a positive indication of support for rural students, challenges remain.

Firstly, results are not truly reflective of merit. It is reportedly fairly easy to obtain answers to the NST ahead of time, and students have actually been *encouraged* by certain universities to memorize all of the answers rather than to think critically about them during the exam.[26]

Secondly, average test scores are consistently higher among students from urban areas compared to rural, as are those achieved by students who take it in Russian compared to Kyrgyz or Uzbek.[27] This provides evidence of a persisting geographic and linguistic discrepancy within primary and secondary education.

Thirdly, at a time when only 11 out of 42 (26%) universities in Bishkek operated primarily on Kyrgyz as the LoI, 65% of test takers chose to take the NST in Kyrgyz.[28] Therefore, it is likely that many students who are most comfortable speaking Kyrgyz are attending non-Kyrgyz-language HEIs. This was supported by the author's survey results, which revealed that 46.4% of respondents went to primary and secondary schools with Kyrgyz as the main LoI, but only 24.9% selected Kyrgyz as the LoI at their university.

And fourthly, due to inadequate funding from the government, public universities rely heavily on fee-paying students. This results in corruption where fee-paying students are essentially guaranteed high marks and a diploma regardless of their academic performance.[29] A recent study found that 82% of students felt that corruption was a common occurrence at their HEI.[30] This disincentivizes support for those that face language barriers in the classroom since their earning of a diploma is not contingent upon their actual comprehension of the material and skills taught.

4. Psychological and Economic Impacts

In addition to academic repercussions, the promotion of some languages over others has psychological impacts on speakers of the undervalued languages. Kyrgyz is often treated as an inferior and less useful language in educational and professional spheres. At one Russian-language

[22] Anara Momunalieva et al., "The Quality of Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan through the Eyes of Students," *Quality in Higher Education* 26, no. 3 (2020): 343, https://doi.org/10.1080/13538322.2020.1790122.
[23] Shamatov, "Language and Education Quality in Kyrgyzstan," 3566.
[24] Ibid., 3566.
[25] Ibid., 3570.
[26] Drummond and De Young, "Perspectives and Problems in Education Reform in Kyrgyzstan," 228.
[27] Ibid., 232.
[28] Ibid., 231.
[29] DeYoung, *Lost in Transition: Redefining Students and Universities in the Contemporary Kyrgyz Republic*, 112.
[30] Krawchenko, "Universities and Society in Kyrgyzstan," 144.

institution, 30% of Kyrgyz speakers reported feeling shame from not being able to speak Russian fluently.[31] This not only degrades students' sense of self-worth, but it also damages student-teacher relations and dissuades students from attending class. A student at Bishkek National University cited shame as the reason she stopped going to class: "My teacher could not explain things well to me; and she also said things like 'you are from the south'; that 'you are village girls.'... It made me so sad, and after that, I did not come to her classes."[32] In this case, the perception of Russian as a superior language shielded the teacher from admitting to herself that *she* lacked skills in an important language for the region, deflecting the weakness onto the student. The correlation between higher education and students' future economic earnings has been well documented.[33] Dropping out of university puts students from rural areas especially at risk of falling victim to intergenerational poverty due to the intersection of higher poverty rates and poorer Russian-language instruction.[34]

**Suggestion for government action**

Since multilingualism will likely become only more valuable in the future, I suggest that the Kyrgyz government invest in equalizing the linguistic landscape at the primary and secondary school level. To do this, all schools must adequately prepare their students with the ability to freely speak both Russian and Kyrgyz, preferably also offering a foreign language such as English or Turkish. Doing so will ensure that urban and rural students enter most public and private schools on an equal footing and make attending foreign-language universities accessible for more students.

**Implications for further research**

The economic impact of linguistic variance has yet to be fully explored and has enormous potential to benefit Kyrgyzstan's development. Despite high graduation rates and literacy levels, in 2021 Kyrgyzstan ranked 118 out of 191 countries on the Human Development Index and had one of the lowest GDPs per capita in the world: $1,277.[35] A 2017 survey found that households in Kyrgyzstan headed by someone with a degree from an HEI earned only 4.1% more than those headed by someone with only primary vocational training.[36] Aside from a deficient job market, existing issues within the higher education system impede students' ability to acquire the skills and knowledge needed to strengthen Kyrgyzstan's economy. Based on the evidence discussed in this paper, linguistic variance is likely to hinder much of this potential growth.

A potential direction for further research is examining the effects linguistic capabilities have on post-graduation job opportunities and income brackets. The author's survey results showed that 64.1% of respondents believe it is not enough to know Russian and / or Kyrgyz to get a good job in Kyrgyzstan; rather, comprehension of a third language is necessary as well (fig. 6). Higher-paying jobs within Kyrgyzstan may tend to be offered by foreign companies requiring knowledge in foreign languages. Therefore, students' language skills may impact the income that

[31] Korth, "Education and Linguistic Division in Kyrgyzstan," 101.
[32] DeYoung, *Lost in Transition: Redefining Students and Universities in the Contemporary Kyrgyz Republic*, 116.
[33] Deirdre Bloome et al., "Educational Inequality, Educational Expansion, and Intergenerational Income Persistence in the United States," *American Sociological Review* 83, no. 6 (2018).
[34] "The Kyrgyz Republic: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper," International Monetary Fund, August 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14247.pdf.
[35] "Human Development Report 2021-22: Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World," United Nations Development Programme, September 8, 2022, https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/global-report-document/hdr2021-22reportenglish_0.pdf.
[36] Krawchenko, "Universities and Society in Kyrgyzstan," 143.

they are able to earn, their ability to move abroad, and the wealth they are able to contribute back to Kyrgyzstan.





Figure 6.

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# SECTION 7

## WOMEN'S STUDIES

**"Bridal Abductions: Cultural Norms vs. Human Rights in Kyrgyzstan"**

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**Abstract**

The kidnapping of a young female with the prospect of a forced, non-consensual marriage, is a practice that has become a tradition in the Central Asian nation of Kyrgyzstan. Non-consensual bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan was outlawed when the state joined the Soviet Union and is outlawed under the current government of the Kyrgyz Republic. The government of the Kyrgyz Republic has additionally signed numerous international legal agreements, codes, conventions, and protocols that prevent the human rights and women's rights abuse that is non-consensual bride kidnapping. Although there is a plethora of separate traditions practiced by different peoples throughout the process of non-consensual bride kidnapping, this article presents a multitude of the most common recorded traditions of the process throughout Kyrgyzstan. Despite slight variances in quantitative analysis due to the logistics and limited studies conducted throughout the region, the primary emphasis of this article is the fact that the Kyrgyz Republic is allowing non-consensual bride kidnapping to occur. Thus, the premise of this article is to display the inhumane and illegal tradition of non-consensual bride kidnapping throughout Kyrgyzstan, a quantitative analysis on the women affected, in addition to all legal commitments that the Kyrgyz Republic have not upheld to protect their female citizens.

**Introduction**

This article provides a comprehensive analysis on the history and modern implications of bride kidnapping in the Central Asian nation of Kyrgyzstan, which is referred to in Kyrgyz as "*Kyz ala kachuu,*" meaning, "to take and run away with a girl." Although the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic outlawed the practice of non-consensual bride kidnapping in 1997, enforcement of the law against this human rights abuse has been minimal due to its traditionality in Kyrgyz culture. There are two forms of bride kidnapping that have occurred and continue to occur in Kyrgyzstan: consensual / recreational bride kidnapping, and non-consensual bride kidnapping. Consensual / recreational bride kidnapping confers the mutual consent of a woman and future groom, and this approach is typically a staged occasion as opposed to the non-consensual method. Non-consensual bride kidnapping occurs whenever a female is taken by a male with neither their consent nor the consent of their parents, which is the primary focus of this article. The purpose of the contents of this article is to call upon the government of the Kyrgyz Republic to seriously enforce the law they established in 1997, which would reinforce their commitment to the international agreements the government had signed regarding women's rights and human rights. This article may be useful for academic research, human rights agencies, women's rights agencies, lawyers, and judges, domestic and international NGOs, in addition to domestic and international financial agencies that support economic, human, social, theocratic, legislative, and judicial development.

**Historical Background on Kyrgyz Bride Kidnapping**

Deciphering the origins of the tradition of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan is incredibly complex, considering that there are far too many conflicting stories and sources that lead to an indecisive answer. Historians researching Kyrgyz culture and traditions suggest that the process of bride kidnapping dates back to the 9th century AD, around the time of the *Epic of Manas*, an epic

regarding the first khagan of the Kyrgyz Khaganate which the Kyrgyz eulogize.[1] Following the rise of the Yenisei Kirghiz Khanate in the early thirteenth century, numerous traditions and rituals have been recorded, yet it is perplexing to verify each story and one story may have only been subject to one tribe. One recorded tradition from a tribe of the Yenisei Kirghiz Khanate near the Issyk-Kul region in the mid-thirteenth century detailed a race between the potential groom and the father of the potential bride, and if the potential groom was victorious then the father would allow the groom to ride away with his daughter; eventually meeting with his daughter's new family after the ritual.[2] Another pre-Soviet Kyrgyz bride kidnapping tradition revolved once more around a potential groom providing a request from the father for his daughter's hand in marriage, except under this story, it included a race between the potential groom and potential bride. The potential bride received a fifteen-second start and a whip to strike the potential groom; if the man could catch the woman and kiss her on horseback, then he won the right to ask for the woman's hand in marriage and could escort her back to his family in a similar fashion to the previous account. This specific tradition is regarded as *Kyskuumay*, or "kiss the girl." However, these traditional practices have become significantly more reckless and radicalized in the modern era.

Prior to continuing to the modern era, it is important to account for the fact that once Kyrgyzstan came under the control of the USSR in 1917, the education policy that Vladimir Lenin had applied resulted in the prioritization of education and prevented the marriages of young girls before the age of 15. More importantly, the practice of bride kidnapping within the Soviet Union at this time was outlawed,[3] yet imitations of the tradition were still practiced throughout the Republic in the form of a consensual kidnapping.

**The Process of Non-Consensual Bride Kidnapping in Modern Times**

Initially, a Kyrgyz man seeks out a woman that he believes would be the quintessential bride, whether it be at his own interest, or his family encourages him to find a wife. Whenever the groom believes that he is prepared to wed, he finds a congregation of men that help to orchestrate the kidnapping. There are numerous variations in which the kidnapping process ensues. On some occasions, female relatives or friends of the potential bride will help orchestrate the process, in which the groom will typically lure his future bride to a secluded location or stalk her in a public environment and abduct her. Other common variations include inviting a girl to an event and abducting her there, or the congregation of kidnappers waits for the future bride to exit her household or yurt and steal her against her will. All of these processes have a common trope in which the groom will join his accomplices in forcefully ravaging the woman into a car, horse-carried wagon, or other means of transportation at the opportune moment.[4]

The next aspect of the process involves bringing the woman to the groom's house, and it is reportedly common for a wedding dinner to be in the preparation process or completely prepared once the woman arrives at the residence. While the kidnapped woman cowers in fear, the mother of the groom and eldest female of the groom's family forcefully attempt to place the *jaluk* scarf on the kidnapped woman's head; once the *jaluk* is placed on her head, she is considered to be married.

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[1] *Manas*, trans. Walter May (Kirghiz Branch of International Centre "Traditional Cultures and Environments," 1995), 4.

[2] Fabio Belafatti, "Gendered Nationalism, Neo-Nomadism, and Ethnic-based Exclusivity in Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Uzbek Nationalist Discourses," *Studia Orientalia Electronica* 7 (2019): 74.

[3] Aizat Aisarakunova, "Globalization and Kyrgyz Traditional Culture," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 54, no. 1 (2010): 4.

[4] Noor O'Neill Borbieva, "Kidnapping Women: Discourse of Emotion and Social Change in the Kyrgyz Republic," *Anthropological Quarterly* 85, no. 1 (2012): 143.

Afterwards, the groom's family is expected to complete the *achuu basar* which translates to "anger suppression" in Kyrgyz. *Achuu basar* involves apologizing to the bride's family for the means in which their daughter was kidnapped, providing gifts such as livestock, getting acquainted with the bride's family, and requesting a blessing from the bride's parents.[5] Due to the staunch adherence of Kyrgyz people to their traditional values, the parents of the bride predominantly agree to the terms of their daughter's marriage, as in Kyrgyz culture, a woman is no longer considered to be pure if she entered a male's home under such circumstances. Furthermore, if a woman were to decline the marriage, she would face scrutiny from her family, village, and or tribe due to her disrespect of the Kyrgyz tradition and degradation of her character. A recorded tradition states that if the woman attempted to escape, the eldest female of the groom's family would lay her head down in front of the door or yurt entrance and state the societal ramifications that the woman would face if she stepped over her head. Thus, the dichotomy for Kyrgyz women placed in non-consensual bridal kidnappings is to either become the bride of their kidnapper or be considered as undesirable and disgraceful women in Kyrgyz culture.[6]

The conclusion of the process occurs when an Imam is called forth to officiate the wedding and pronounce the couple as husband wife before Allah and the families. Once this process has concluded, the bride and groom are expected to exit the home or yurt with their backs facing the exit as a traditional sign of respect to symbolize the support and commitment to the conjunction of the new family.[7] Come nightfall, the groom is expected to fornicate with his new wife per tradition, yet since the marriage was non-consensual the adequate term for this process is rape. After raping the bride, the groom and other family members examine the sheet for the blood of the female, which would confirm that the bride is a virgin. In return, the family of the groom would deliver *suyunchu*, which is a Kyrgyz phrase for positive familial related news, to the family of the bride and eulogize the parents for preserving their daughter's virginity. The next morning, it is customary for the blood-stained sheet to be hung outside for the families and wedding guests to observe, in order to proclaim to viewers that the wife was pure prior to the wedding.[8] After the hanging of the sheet on the day succeeding the wedding, the final celebration between both families ensues. On this date, the wife is expected to prove her worth to her new family via means of cooking, cleaning, attending to other family members, in addition to any other task that the family requests. Once the celebration has concluded, the family of the wife customarily provides their blessings for the new couple prior to making their exit. Thereon, the wife is expected to provide children for the family, and to work for the family as opposed to assuming an occupation or continuing educational studies.[9]

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[5] Russ Kleinbach and Lilly Salimjanova, "*Kyz ala kachuu and adat*: Non-Consensual Bride Kidnapping and Tradition in Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asian Survey* 26, n. 2 (2007): 219.
[6] Begimai Sataeva, "Public Shaming and Resistance in the Context of the Bride Kidnapping Phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan" (master's thesis, University of Utrecht, 2017), 16.
[7] Russell Kleinbach and Gazbubu Babaiarova, "Reducing Non-Consensual Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan," *Eurasian Journal of Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2013): 63.
[8] G. Reza Arabsheibani et al., "A Note on Bride Kidnapping and Labour Supply Behaviour of Kyrgyz Women," *Economic Systems* 45, no. 4 (2021), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/113438/1/KyrgyzPaper_Main_Doc_with_Authors_details_Nov2020.pdf.
[9] Cynthia Werner et al., "Bride Kidnapping in Post-Soviet Eurasia: A Roundtable Discussion," *Central Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (2018): 600.

**Statistics on Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan**

Considering the low density of Kyrgyzstan and lack of available statistics on both consensual and non-consensual bride kidnapping, it has been rather difficult to obtain accurate measures of the practice throughout the history of pre-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, and the modern Kyrgyz Republic. With Kyrgyzstan's new census system, it is estimated that 1.1 million inhabitants reside in the capital, Bishkek, whereas approximately 5.6 million Kyrgyz citizens live throughout the countryside as of the year 2022.[10] Although bride kidnapping does occur throughout the capital of Bishkek, the majority are a result of consensual kidnappings where the couple had known each other prior to the abduction; once more, it is especially difficult to derive these most precise statistics on this matter.[11] The primary emphasis on these inhabitant statistics is the fact that the majority of the population lives in remote areas with significantly less density than the capital, whereby significantly more instances of bride kidnapping have occurred outside of Bishkek due to the upholding this nomadic-based tradition.

One study conducted by a team of researchers fervently involved in Kyrgyzstan led by Dr. Kleinbach and his colleagues discovered in a north-eastern region of Kyrgyzstan that within their sample of 543 female respondents, 374 were kidnapped for marriage. Thus, approximately 68.9% of the women surveyed in this region claimed to have been kidnapped, in which only thirty four percent of the kidnappings were arranged with the consent of the woman. Kleinbach's research furthers the differentiations amongst generations in bride kidnapping in which 64% of women aged 76 and older claimed to have been kidnapped, of which 43% of kidnappings were non-consensual; 47% of all 36–56-year-old married women were kidnapped without their consent; lastly, 63% of women aged 16-25 were kidnapped against their will. The striking conclusions of Kleinbach and his colleagues' research displays that approximately 50% of Kyrgyz marriages were based on bride kidnapping in 1999-2001, in which two-thirds were nonconsensual. Kleinbach and his colleagues' re-examination of the situation in 2004 discovered that number of marriages via bride kidnapping increased to 80%, with 57% of these marriages classified as non-consensual.[12]

In more recent times, an April survey in 2022 conducted by Professors Chi and Hofmann discovered that approximately thirty-three to forty percent of all marriages in Kyrgyzstan are associated with bride kidnapping, and the numbers have increasingly risen.[13] Despite the outlaw of this procedure by the Kyrgyz government in their Criminal Code in 1994, reports estimate that one in every seven-hundred cases actually gets heard by a jury, as the majority of cases were dismissed due to the traditionality of this practice.[14] It is vital to understand that the data and information correlated to the process of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan is incredibly limited, wherein the statistics provided by Kleinbach and colleagues only applied to the north-eastern region of Kyrgyzstan.

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[10] "Population Census Enters the Digital Age in Kyrgyzstan," United Nations Population Fund, May 20, 2022, https://www.unfpa.org/news/population-census-enters-digital-age-kyrgyzstan.

[11] Hillary Margolis, "Young Woman's Murder in Kyrgyzstan Shows Cost of 'Tradition,'" Human Rights Watch, May 31, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/31/young-womans-murder-kyrgyzstan-shows-cost-tradition.

[12] Russell Kleinbach at al., "Kidnapping for Marriage (*ala-kachuu*) in a Kyrgyz Village," *Central Asian Survey* 24, no. 1 (2005): 195.

[13] Erin Trouth Hofmann and Guangqing Chi, "Bride Kidnapping and Gendered Labor Migration: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 48, no. 11 (2022): 2494.

[14] "Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan," WorldAtlas, accessed September 16, 2024, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/bride-kidnapping-in-kyrgyzstan.html.

**Contradictions by the Kyrgyz Government**

Despite the variance of data throughout the provided contents, it is still evident that non-consensual bride kidnapping occurs although the government of Kyrgyzstan outlawed the practice. In order to adhere to their laws and continue the tradition, the alternative for the Kyrgyz peoples should be the performance of consensual and only consensual bride kidnappings as they recreated in Soviet times. In a legal sense, non-consensual bride kidnappings are: a violation of Kyrgyz law, a violation of the Holy Quran and Islam (which is cited by Imams or other forms of ministers to officiate the wedding between the non-consenting bride and the groom), a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a violation of the United Nations Charter which the Kyrgyz government ratified on March 2, 1992, a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights agreement ratified by the government of Kyrgyzstan on October 7, 1994, a violation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ratified by Kyrgyzstan on October 7, 1994, a violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women which Kyrgyzstan ratified on February 10, 1997, and the Convention on Consent to Marry which was ratified on February 10, 1997.[15]

1. Violation of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic (ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic on September 18, 1997)

Under Article 18 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, "Persons that have reached the age of 14 prior the commission of crime shall be criminally liable for… kidnapping (Article 123)." If said criminal meets this age requirement, Article 123 specifies, "Kidnapping against the will of the kidnapped person, followed by displacement and consequent holding such person in a place other than the permanent residence, with no attributes of the offense provided by Article 227 hereof, committed through capture, deception or in another manner, using non-hazardous violence, - shall be sentenced by 4 to 8 years of imprisonment." The succeeding article, Article 124, specifies another circumstance in which kidnapping is outlawed within their borders, "Trafficking, including recruiting, transport, harboring, reception, transfer, purchase and sale of a person or another unlawful transaction with or without such person's consent, using force, blackmail, fraud, deception, kidnapping for the purpose of further exploitation or other interests – shall be sentenced by 5 to 10 years of imprisonment with or with no property seizure." According to Article 153 Clause 3, "Kidnapping of a person under the age of 16 for further contraction of common-law marriage, – shall be sentenced by 3 to 7 years of imprisonment." Lastly, Article 155 specifically outlines, "Coercion of a woman into marriage, continuation of marriage cohabitation, or kidnapping for further marriage contraction against her will, as well as preventing a woman from contracting marriage, – shall be sentenced by fine in amount of 100 to 200 minimum monthly wages, or up to 5 years of imprisonment." Therefore, the government of Kyrgyzstan is appropriating this tradition despite numerous Kyrgyz laws barring the exact kidnapping experienced by females throughout the process of *kyz ala kachuu*.[16]

2. Violation of Islamic Law

With Kyrgyzstan being an almost entirely Muslim nation, it is impractical for Imams to cite Islam and officiate non-consensual marriages in the name of Allah. Furthermore, any individual who participates in a non-consensual marriage is not acting within the bounds of Islam,

[15] For simplicity, I will list my sources in the footnotes at the end of each subsection.

[16] "Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic," Antislavery in Domestic Legislation, accessed September 16, 2024, https://antislaverylaw.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Kyrgyzstan-Criminal-Code.pdf.

performing haram activity and performing a disservice to the religion. In Sunan an-Nasa'i 3267, Abu Hurairah narrated that the Messenger of Allah stated the following on non-consensual marriages, "A previously married woman should not be married until her consent has been sought, and a virgin should not be married until her permission has been sought."[17]

3. Violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic on March 2, 1992)

The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights conscripted by members of the United Nations states, "Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women." With bride kidnapping ensuing within the borders of Kyrgyzstan, the government fails to adhere to the doctrine they ratified, for women are treated as property and can be easily stolen due to the government's nearly non-existent implementation of measures that prevent the process. Article 2 of the Declaration furthers, "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind…." Once more, Kyrgyzstan is not fostering a culture within their society that supports the rights and freedoms for women set forth in the doctrine with the continuation of bride kidnapping. Articles 3-5 further the ideology that human beings ought to remain free, shall not be held in servitude or slavery, nor should they be subject to any form of torture, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment; all of the following is absent throughout the entire process of bride kidnapping which the Kyrgyz Republic fails to condemn. Article 9 specifies that no human being should be forcefully subjected to detention or exile, in which Article 12 furthers that no human being should encounter arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon their honor and reputation. Lastly, and most pertinent to the subject of this article is Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states, "Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." The government of the Kyrgyz Republic has not acted within accordance of the United Nations doctrine that they have signed, thus, breaking international law.[18]

4. Violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic on October 7, 1994)

The Kyrgyz Republic fractures the validity of their ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights due to their violation of Article 2 Clause 3a, which by design, "Ensure(s) that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy." Said remedy appears in the form of competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities where the authorities enforce such remedies, which Kyrgyzstan has failed to provide due to the lack of prosecution on bride kidnapping. Regarding freedom of movement and the prevention of kidnapping, Article 9 details, "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of

[17] Mohammed B. Ibraheem At-Tawaijiri, *The Book of Nicah*, The Comprehensive Muslim E-Library, accessed September 24, 2024, https://www.muslim-library.com/dl/books/english_the_book_of_nikah_marriage.pdf.
[18] "Universal Declaration of Human rights," United Nations, accessed September 16, 2024, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

(their) liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law." Non-consensual marriage is an arbitrary detention, and certainly a deprivation of a female's liberty.[19]

5. Violation of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic on February 10, 1997)

Considering the government of Kyrgyzstan's disdain for upholding their own laws, in addition to the plethora of other international agreements they have signed that would prevent bride kidnapping, it is safe to assert that Kyrgyzstan has failed to uphold their commitment to their ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.[20]

6. Violation of the Convention on Consent to Marry (ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic on February 10, 1997)

Kyrgyzstan immediately fails to comply with their ratification of the Convention on Consent to Marry, in which Article 1 of this doctrine states, "No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage and of witnesses, as prescribed by law."[23]

**Conclusion**

Non-consensual bride kidnapping throughout Kyrgyzstan is overwhelmingly detrimental to all parties involved, especially to the women who get kidnapped. Bride kidnapping, and kidnapping in general, violates numerous human rights and women's rights. With the Kyrgyz Republic allowing this practice of bride kidnapping, they are violating the numerous international legal agreements, codes, conventions, and protocols they have signed. Due to the government of Kyrgyzstan not upholding the laws that they agreed to in order to protect their female citizens, they are fostering a culture that is detrimental to both genders. Men who participate and promote this process are committing blatant violations of human and women rights, in addition to professing their lack of morality and humanity. The women encountering non-consensual bride kidnapping are usurped of their dignity and honor. The dichotomy they encounter is to either reject the marriage and bring disgrace to their family, village, and traditions, or to accept the non-consensual marriage against their own will. As displayed, these kidnapped women are expected to provide and work for the family as opposed to holding the ability to choose where and how they please to work. Preventing women from assuming jobs or education outside of their forced marriage is detrimental to the advancement of socioeconomic and developmental facets of Kyrgyzstan, for women provide beneficial outputs to society. Considering that the majority of the female workforce is prevented from working due to either their husbands or the nervosity of being kidnapped for marriage, overall societal development in the Kyrgyz Republic is harmed, as excluding female

[19] "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966," United Nations, accessed September 16, 2024, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_2200A(XXI)_civil.pdf.

[20] "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women New York, 18 December 1979," United Nations, accessed September 16, 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-elimination-all-forms-discrimination-against-women.

[23] "Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages," United Nations, accessed September 16, 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-consent-marriage-minimum-age-marriage-and.

participation is excluding a significant portion of their society.[24] Whereby, Kyrgyzstan ought to seriously enforce their own laws, in addition to upholding their commitment to the international litigation that they signed in order to prevent the human rights and women's rights violation that is non-consensual bride kidnapping.

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**"Suspended Violence: Princess Olga and Feminine Violence in Medieval Rus"**
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Most acts of violence perpetrated by women in early Scandinavian writings are read and depicted as evil. One can take Kriemhild, the main character of the *Nibelungenlied*, an epic Germanic poem from the 1200s as a key example. After her husband is murdered, she kills her brothers in revenge by beheading them with a sword. Kriemhild is nearly universally, by scholars and readers, seen as a villain; the "largest body of opinion interprets Kriemhild as a representative of the evil woman, who, driven by bloodlust, becomes a demon."[1] It is important to note that she is not considered simply evil, but is considered an evil *woman*: her evilness is intrinsically tied to her womanhood because she is evil not for her actions, but for how her actions clash with the expectations of women.[2] Her actions are so detached from traditional feminine ideals that the easiest and most common way for her character to be interpreted is as demonic possession.[3]

This interpretation both condemns her and distances her from her violence — it becomes a demon's violence, not Kriemhild's. Many men in the *Nibelungenlied* commit acts of violence, and yet none of them are considered to be possessed. Much of why Kriemhild is portrayed as a demon is because "Kriemhild is encroaching on one of the most important bastions of male power, the power to kill."[4] It is easier to grapple with a man, or a demon, committing this violent act than a woman.

Kriemhild's negative perception can be traced to her representations being, as Eve Tuck defines, "damage-centered."[5] In her open letter, entitled "Suspending Damage," Tuck contends that Indigenous communities have been researched and conceptualized as "damage-centered." The stories told are ones of suffering, made with the assumption that if enough damage is demonstrated, reparations will be given to repair communities. She argues, moreover, that the research studies done to date on Indigenous communities are nearly exclusively about their faults and victimhood. Tuck argues that this mindset is not only unproductive but is also actively harmful to Indigenous communities. It instills internal and external conceptions of brokenness, and Indigenous communities deserve better.[6] Tuck provides an alternate method of research: desire-based research. Desire-based research is research rooted in growth, rather than deficiencies; it is a framework rooted in the assertion that communities and people are more than their brokenness and damage.[7] It builds and focuses on productive and informed research and study.

Kriemhild's depiction in the *Nibelungenlied* is very different from the research around Indigenous communities, and one cannot study her in this framework without acknowledging that this is not a one-to-one congruence. A Scandinavian noblewoman is not equal in power to an Indigenous community. There are differences in power, current perceptions, respect granted, and their relevance to the living experience of people today. This is not to say we cannot apply Tuck's framework, but rather that we must use it with care. Tuck's definition of damage-centered research can be used to describe Kriemhild's historiography: Kriemhild is defined by her damage, her husband's murder, and she is thought to have been taken over by a demon due to that damage. The

[1] Laura Bethany Ann Wideburg, "Kriemhild: Demon-Hero-Woman" (PhD thesis, University of Washington, 1993), 2.
[2] Jenny Jochens, *Old Norse Images of Women* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 162.
[3] Wideburg, "Kriemhild," 3.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Eve Tuck, "Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities," *Harvard Educational Review* 79, no. 3 (2009): 415.
[6] Ibid., 415-416.
[7] Ibid., 416.

revenge she achieves comes solely from the impact of her damage. More than that, her damage actively transforms her into a demon, through which she is irreparably broken. Though she achieves revenge, she is killed afterwards: Kriemhild has no story after her damage. It is as such that one can connect Kriemhild and Tuck's frameworks; as Tuck identifies damage in Indigenous communities, so too are Kriemhild's narratives solely focused on how her damage defines and envelops her.

In contrast, the historical figure Olga, a Rus princess with a story of revenge similar to Kriemhild, is not enveloped by her damage.[8] "Olga's Vengeance," as told in the *Primary Chronicle*, regales the reader with the tale of Olga, Prince Igor's widow, and the revenge she enacted for her husband's murder. The tale begins with Prince Igor's defeat and death at the hands of the Derevlians. The Derevlians tell Olga this news and suggest she marry Mal, Prince of Dereva. In response, Olga repeatedly tricks the Derevlians and murders many soldiers in revenge. This revenge, as the text describes, "reflects little saintliness," though she was later canonized by the Orthodox Church.[9] Each act of violence increases in drama, concluding with her burning the entirety of the Derevlian city, Iskorosten.

Rather than Kriemhild's damage-centered narrative, Olga's story is told through a desire-based narrative. This is a narrative based on growth and achievement, on the self-determination of the damaged individual. While Olga's story is focused on her revenge, the revenge is not all consuming. The story highlights Olga's cunningness and her trickery, and it continues even after her revenge has been completed. Olga does not commit her acts of violence with the masculine bloodthirst Kriemhild does; in contrast, she is reserved and sits in a position of command. This controlled position highlights that her vengeance is a *desire*.[10] She is not acting out of pure rage but is thinking and planning her revenge. Just as first-degree murder is sentenced more strictly than second-degree murder, the premeditated nature of these acts of violence makes it clearer that they were choices, desires. This control is demonstrated by the author portraying Olga's violence differently from Kriemhild's masculine savagery; instead, the authors feminize her violence. This feminization of Olga's violence allowed her depiction to be positive, because the taboo against women who perpetrate violence is not necessarily against their violence but is instead against women encroaching on the "male" act of killing.

Olga's violence is described "femininely," and thus does not clash with traditional ideals of womanhood. But to understand what feminine violence means in the *Primary Chronicle* for Olga, one must contextualize feminine violence both culturally, in order to understand what was in popular texts and writings at the time, and religiously, as the *Primary Chronicle* was written by a monk and thus is implicitly a religious document. We must especially notice the positive or negative conceptualizations of the women who perpetrate the violence.

To understand the cultural context of feminine violence, we can study Brynhildr, another character in the *Nibelungenlied*, whose feminization and resulting positive perceptions are incredibly similar to Olga. Brynhildr, like Kriemhild, kills a man in revenge, but differs in that Brynhildr orders her men to enact the violence, rather than doing it herself. She is not the one interacting with her victim, and does not participate in a physical, and thus masculine, act. Brynhildr, unlike Kriemhild, is not depicted as evil. She is thought of as beautiful and justified and

[8] Tuck, "Suspending Damage," 416.
[9] *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text,* trans. Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), 22.
[10] Tuck, "Suspending Damage," 416.

does not raise the level of condemnation Kriemhild has.[11] Brynhildr is treated more positively historically because she is more distanced from her violence: the murder she is responsible for was not carried out by her hands.

Brynhildr falls into the Old Norse female archetype of the whetter, "a woman whose fame rested on murderous deeds of revenge that she achieved, however, not by direct physical action but indirectly through performative speech-acts of goading and inciting men to execute her purposes."[12] Whetters are nearly entirely heroines, treated positively and praised — a stark contrast to how most women who perpetrate violence are treated. This differing treatment comes from their violence being considered more feminine, because they are not physically attacking anyone. Physical blows are associated with men and masculinity, and the whetter archetype does not conflict this narrative. Men are still the ones physically attacking, inflicting the damage, therefore traditional standards are not being broken. Whetters are always *hurt* women; they are enacting revenge for some harm done to them. Yet Brynhildr, the whetter archetype, and women whose violence is feminized, still make something out of that damage. They enact the violence they desire without being overtaken by their damage and are subsequently treated more positively than women who commit more direct, masculine acts of violence.

The religious context of the *Primary Chronicle* yields similar conclusions. We can see the trend of women who commit masculine acts of violence being reviled in the Bible, a key example being Delilah, a woman from the Book of Judges. Delilah was loved by Samson, a man renowned for his strength and invincibility. She was bribed by the lords of the Philistines to identify Samson's weakness, and does so, leading to his death. Delilah is almost universally condemned in Christian interpretations.[13] She is the hand of the violence, and acts as mercenary for the Philistines, standing in direct opposition to expectations of how women should act. The mercenary position is deeply masculine—one even saw the male mercenary in the aforementioned archetype of the whetter—so a woman taking up this role to betray a man who loves her, when women are expected to care and love men in return, deeply contrasts expectations. This leads to Delilah's condemnation, whereas other murderous biblical figures have been forgiven.

Delilah can be contrasted with the heroine Jael, also from the Book of Judges. Jael drives a stake through the head of Sisera, a commander from Hazor, responsible for twenty years of oppressing the Israelites.[14] Her treatment in interpretations, which is as a heroine, seems initially to contrast our conclusions of how women who perpetrate violence are conceived: driving the stake through Sisera's head is a bloody, violent, and masculine act, and yet Jael is praised. However, Jael's violence is "feminized" by the surrounding textual context. Sisera had entered her tent after invading her traveling group and demanded water from her. She instead brought him milk, a symbol highly tied to womanhood.[15][16] This sets Jael up as a feminine figure, and she even restates to Sisera as he dies that "you have fallen into the hands of a woman."[17] Jael is not threatening the tradition of killing as a male act—she acknowledges that this is an exception and

[11] Francis Butler, "A Woman of Words: Pagan Ol'ga in the Mirror of Germanic Europe," *Slavic Review* 63, no. 4 (2004): 771–93.
[12] Jochens, *Old Norse Images of Women,* 162.
[13] Madlyn Kahr, "Delilah," *The Art Bulletin* 54, no. 3 (1972): 282–99.
[14] Edgar J. Bruns, "Judith or Jael?" *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 16, no. 1 (1954): 12–14.
[15] James H. Charlesworth, *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha: Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments* (Doubleday, 1983), 53.
[16] Rachel Muers, "The Ethics of Breast-Feeding: A Feminist Theological Exploration," *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion* 26, no. 1 (2010): 7–24.
[17] Charlesworth, *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 53.

feminizes the violence as much as possible. Thus, the Bible can continue with nothing but praise for Jael.[18]

This was the historical religious context in which Nestor, a monk in the earth 12th century, was writing the Russian *Primary Chronicle*, a key source for many historians studying early Rus', and where we learn about Olga. This is a highly influential text of Slavic history.[19] He wrote the *Primary Chronicle* between 1110 and 1120 CE as a chronology, sequentially noting what Nestor believed to be the most important pieces of Rus history.[20] These are not full and complete stories; "it constitutes the introductory part of many annalistic works that chronicle subsequent events in various parts of the East Slavic World."[21] The context in which the *Primary Chronicle* was written is key to understanding its goals. Nestor wrote it as a resource for God to use when judging Rus' and intended for it to include everything God should know. Nestor wrote the *Primary Chronicle* with eternal consequences in mind.

Nestor includes battles, invasions, wars, the changing of monarchs, marriages he deems notable, famines, conquests, treaties, and other niche items he finds relevant. He was frequently a succinct author, summing up wars and conquering in one sentence. He left no room for uncertainties and fluff; "the Kievan writer specifies rules that were established and explicit, not a general atmosphere."[22] One entire chapter is described as: "there are no specific details."[23] Clearly, Nestor feels no inherent duty to depth in his writing. So, when he does focus on a chapter and give it details and nuance, we must pay attention. There is a purposefulness in what he dedicates time to, the ratio of years to words is often shocking, as he speeds past decades without missing a beat. On page 58, for example, Nestor simply jumps from 997 CE to 1015 CE, with no hesitation whatsoever.[24] If nothing he deems relevant to the divine judgment of Rus happened, the chronicler sees no reason to give any information.

"Olga's Vengeance" does not cover very much history, in the grand scheme of Rus', and yet takes up six pages. This may not seem like very many, but the chapter covers barely two years, and only one woman's actions within that. It is not even the entirety of Olga's story, as it doesn't cover her canonization or eventual death. Nestor deemed these two years, these acts of magnificent violence, as important — important enough to take up space in a text where he had frighteningly little space and an unfathomable amount of time to cover.

"Olga's Vengeance" is also the only chapter in the *Primary Chronicle* that is solely about a woman, and Olga is the most fleshed-out female character the readers meet. Compared to Byzantine Princess Anna, whose marriage to Vladimir was important to the spread of Christianity in Rus, and yet was described in only about a sentence, Olga having an entire chapter seems shocking.[25] The detail with which Nestor describes each act of violence, the personal nature of the story, the sheer amount of text dedicated to one woman, are all unique to Olga. Perhaps the crux of what stands out is the question the chapter raises: why would the chronicler spend so much time on this?

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[18] Bruns, "Judith or Jael?" 12–14.
[19] Horace G. Lunt, "On Interpreting the Russian Primary Chronicle: The Year 1037," *The Slavic and East European Journal* 32, no. 2 (1988): 251.
[20] Ibid., 251.
[21] Ibid., 252.
[22] Ibid., 254.
[23] Ibid., 261.
[24] *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, 58.
[25] Ibid., 28.

The *Primary Chronicle* doesn't simply believe Olga herself deserves so much detail. She acted as regent for her son for 15 years, from 945 to 960, and the chronicle doesn't discuss any of her actions as regent besides revenge—we don't even know her birth year.[26] The chronicle does recount her baptism and conversion to Christianity—a story arguably more important to the history of Christianity in Rus than her revenge. To a monk, wouldn't this be what is worthy of an entire chapter of details? It clearly is not, as the *Primary Chronicle* dedicates far more time to her revenge. Her conversion takes up under two pages and focuses more on her relationships with men: the Emperor Constantine and her son, Svyatoslav. The detailing of her conversion is vague and does not carry the same clear characterization and personalization that "Olga's Vengeance" has. Olga does get some witty moments, such as outsmarting the emperor into not wanting to marry her, but it lacks the drama and uniqueness that her revenge carries.[27]

Olga herself is not what is special—her conversion to Christianity is treated at the same clipped pace as the rest of the chronicle. It is rather her violence that the chronicle treats uniquely. And it is *her* violence, in the possessive sense. That is, she owns this violence. Whereas Kriemhild is enveloped by her damage, in the form of a demon, and this demon takes possession of her violence, Olga's violence is hers and hers alone. To own violence is to be the one in control of the violence, and the one whose desire the violence is satisfying. Here, the violence is satisfying her desire to avenge her husband. The chronicle never suggests this to be revenge for Rus' as a whole for losing their leader, or for the others killed in battle with Igor. No, this is wholly about Olga.

Not only is this possessive sense accurate, it is also necessary. Historically, women's agency has been warped or forgotten in their narratives. To imply this violence is anyone but Olga's would be to treat her as historians typically treated women (and as Kriemhild was treated in the *Nibelungenlied,* wherein her violence was identified as a demon's, not her own) and to deny her the respect she deserves. This is not to say that her violence should be innately praised, or even be considered positively, but her possession of it should be respected. And, as we see in the *Primary Chronicle*, the nature of Olga, a woman possessing this violence, changes how it is written.

Notably, the *Primary Chronicle* doesn't set out to show Olga's actions as evil. She is smart and cunning, justified against the bumbling Derevlians. She gets to revel in her victory, mockingly asking the first victims of her vengeance "whether they found the honor to their taste."[28] The chronicler is on Olga's side: "from the chronicler's perspective, Ol'ga's vengeance is morally justifiable because it advances the interests of her son, the Riurikid dynasty, the people of Rus', and God's plan for salvation."[29] How, then, is Olga's violence to be written, when she is so distanced from what society deems good womanhood, and yet is still supposed to be a positive figure?

One cannot split gender and goodness, to be a *good* woman is also to be a good *woman*. That is, for a woman to be considered good, she needs to be both good, generally, to achieve that which men are lauded for, and she needs to be a good woman, and achieve the feminine ideals expected. Olga does advance and help Rus'. She is, in this context, *good*, but in doing this, she is not a good *woman*, she is not a peacemaker, is not building a family, and is far too tied to violence. Recall the stakes here: the chronicler must both accurately represent Rus' history and show that Rus' is founded by good people, here, a good woman. He can establish her as a good person, but

[26] Boris Gasparov and Olga Raevsky-Hughes, *Christianity and the Eastern Slavs, Volume I: Slavic Cultures in the Middle Ages* (University of California Press, 2018), 24
[27] *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, 82.
[28] Ibid., 23.
[29] Butler, "Pagan Ol'ga in the Mirror of Germanic Europe," 23.

to narratively allow her to be a good woman he must also distance her from her violence. Nestor does this by writing Olga with distance between her and her violence and by feminizing how she enacts violence.

We can identify that her violence is feminized because it is written so differently from a man's violence. To note this difference, take the following chapter of the *Primary Chronicle*: "Sviatoslav's Conquests." Consider the second paragraph: "Svyatoslav sallied forth against the Khazars. When they heard of his approach, they went out to meet him with their Prince, the Kagan, and the armies came to blows. When the battle thus took place, Svyatoslav defeated the Khazars and took their city of Byelavyezha. He also conquered the Yasians and the Kassogians."[30] Svyatoslav is directly tied to all his titular conquests. He is one with the violence enacted, the Khazars go out to meet "him," the subject of each of the verbs describing the Rus'ʼs success is Svyatoslav himself. This differs from how "good" women are written as perpetrators of violence — aforementioned whetters, such as Brynhidlr, are specifically defined as women who order a man or men to enact their revenge.

Svyatoslav's description differs heavily from the descriptions of Olga's first act of revenge: "Now Olga gave command that a large deep ditch should be dug in the castle with the hall, outside the city... They thus were borne into the court before Olga, and when the men had brought the Derevlians in, they dropped them into the trench along with the boat. Olga bent over and inquired whether they found the honor to their taste."[31] Olga is the commander, that is no question, but Olga as commander differs from Svatoslav as commander. She decrees the violence to happen as she *desires* and mocks the Derevlians after the violence has been enacted. But the key verb of the action of the violence, "dropped," is enacted by "the men." This makes her actions less masculine, as men are still doing the killing — a woman can have power, but that power is verbal, through commands, rather than through blows like that of Svatoslav.

The text explicitly holds Olga above her victims (and the men carrying out the actions of her violence) – the Derevlians were brought "before Olga," and she must bend over to address them. In the artistic renderings, she is both actively floating above the Derevlians and sitting high in a tower. This also places her above her soldiers and the entire brutality of the bloodshed. She is not only distanced from the violence but distanced *above* the violence. In her mockery of the Derevlians, she attacks their honor specifically. Honor is an incredibly male concept, so for it to be attacked by a woman adds insult to injury. It is reminiscent of Jael's commentary to Sisera, as the woman perpetrating the violence acknowledges her womanhood. This digs in not only their shame, but also serves as a reminder that Olga is not a man, and this is not male violence.

The distancing between Olga and the act of violence continues in her second act of violence. "Olga's men closed up the bathhouse behind them, and she gave orders to set it on fire from the doors, so that the Derevlians were all burned to death." Here there is no clear verb of violence, we do not know who lit the match, but we do know Olga did not.[32] She ordered it, had full autonomy and power over it, but she did not burn the bathhouse. Her men closed it up, someone she ordered set it on fire, she is far from the action. In the Laurentian painting's depiction of this act of violence, Olga sits upon a throne, her feet do not even touch the ground. There is a sense of privilege in her femininity here, her boots and hands are not bloodied. Her head is covered with a roof, she looks gentle and feminine. Yet she is still in charge of this situation, her hand gestures

[30] *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, 26.
[31] Ibid., 23.
[32] Ibid., 25.

towards the men to carry out her *desires*. Olga may have power, but it is clear in this painting that her power is feminine power, not a man's power.

Her third act of revenge specifically clarifies that Olga is not the one actively carrying out the violence. "When the Derevlians were drunk, she bade her followers fall upon them and went about herself egging on her retinue to the massacre of the Derevlians. So they cut down five thousand of them; but Olga returned to Kiev and prepared an army to attack the survivors."[33] Olga "bids" her followers, and encourages the violence, but she is egging on her army to carry out the massacre, not massacring. She clearly *desires* the violence to happen, but she does not personally carry out the killing as a male regent would. The "they" cutting down thousands of Derevlians does not include Olga, as is made clear by the "but Olga returned…"; she is not a part of the army attacking. In the artistic rendering, she is separated from the army itself, sitting away on a protected throne. A soldier looks back at her, taking cues and orders, but he is still the one bloodied and bloodying. Thus, a distinction between the feminine, Olga, and the masculine, the soldier, is made, and Olga is squarely in the feminine camp. Olga is also distanced from the masculinity through the Derevlian's bumbling drunkenness. She is coy and quick-witted, which is contrasted against the masculine Derevlians.

In Olga's final act of violence, she tricks the city of the Derevlians into giving her a pigeon or a sparrow from each household. Then, she "gave to each soldier in her army a pigeon or sparrow and ordered them to attach [a match] by a thread to each.… When night fell, Olga bade her soldiers release [them] …. The people fled from the city, and Olga ordered her soldiers to catch them."[34] Some verb of command always lies between every act and Olga: "ordered," "bade," "ordered" again. These are all verbs that require an indirect object, here, the men she is ordering. This actively places another actor between her and the violence. She is consistently, in every act of violence, separated from the violence, even though she is still clearly the one in control. The text does not deny her violence, but it still finds the need to separate her from the physical acts. We see, in the textual and artistic renderings of Olga, a distancing from the violence. She is made more feminine so her violence would be acceptable, and she could be the positive figure Nestor wanted and needed.

Olga was written, and shaped, to order violence, a power she could have, but not carry it out. This keeps her within a structure the chronicler could understand, "the story of Ol'ga's revenge is a tale of a woman who achieves bloody but laudable ends without violating the structures that her society placed on women's behavior."[35] There was no world in which Nestor could conceptualize Olga's violence as he would a man's, because he had no prior schema for such an identity, such an existence, because the violence women perpetrate has never been treated the same as a man's. As a monk, much of his inspiration came from the Bible, where we see the positive examples of women who perpetrate violence being acts that are feminized. Nestor is also writing for an audience of 12th century readers who expected women to be docile, feminine, and pious.[36] For his readers to consider Olga the positive figure Nestor is looking for, he understood the necessity of making her fit expectations by feminizing her violence.

It is by fitting into those societal expectations that Olga can maintain possession of her violence. If her violence had been masculine and direct, like Kriemhild's, she would have lost ownership of her violence. Kriemhild is interpreted as having been possessed by a demon, so she

[33] Ibid., 24.
[34] Ibid., 25.
[35] Butler, "Pagan Ol'ga in the Mirror of Germanic Europe," 4.
[36] Gasparov and Raevsky-Hughes, *Christianity and the Eastern Slavs,* 24.

loses all agency over her violence. The demon, her *damage*, is doing the violence. Olga, whose violence is fueled by her *desire*, is still innately tied to it. Where Tuck's framework is used to encourage breaking the norms of how we perceive groups, it is through maintaining social expectations that Olga accesses power. Tuck envisioned desire-based frameworks being used to change narratives, and Olga does so, if in her own way. Olga redefines feminine violence and empowers it, manipulating the rules thrust upon her into a power in itself. She embraces the femininity of her violence so wholly that it is no longer something that makes her weaker, but something that accesses its own privileges. She gains all the benefits of the violence she desires, and yet maintains hands so clean she could still be canonized in the Orthodox church. She sits above both her victims and the soldiers she commands and makes them both warp to her desires.

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